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Foreword: The Brain Sciences
and Criminal Law Norms
by Theodore Y. Blumoff'

Few would dispute the proposition that ... social cognition, emotion,
and behavior (W)emanate from the brain ().'
INTRODUCTION

In general, researchers hope to answer the same ontological question:
"Who are we?" Practitioners address the question in their own unique
ways, employing the rhetoric and idioms, and the agenda and metrics,
that express their respective domains. Researchers in the various brain
sciences work at the frontier of knowledge about our brains, the final
material cause of all of our endeavors. They fully share the commitment
to this fundamental question. From the perspective of the brain
sciences, the answer to this question-though certainly not now and

* Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. St. Louis
University (B.S., 1969; M.A., 1971; Ph.D., 1976); Washington University (J.D., 1982). Many
thanks to friends who have helped along the path to this manuscript, including Oliver
Goodenough, Owen Jones, Karen Kovach, Harold Lewis, Stephen Morse, and Gary Simson
for useful comments and suggestions on earlier parts of this Article. Special thanks to
William Ezzell (Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law, Class of 2011) for
superb proof-reading. I have presented portions of this Article at the Annual Scholarship
Meeting of the Society for the Evolutionary Analysis of Law (Vanderbilt Univ., Apr. 2009;
College of William & Mary, 2010), the Annual Meeting of the Gruter Institute of Law and
Behavioral Research (Squaw Valley, California, May 2009), and a Conference on Law and
the Brain (Univ. College London, July 2009). I am always grateful for the ongoing
financial support of Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law.
1. John T. Cacioppo et al., Just Because You're Imaging the Brain Doesn't Mean You
Can Stop Using Your Head A Primer and Set of FirstPrinciples,85 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 650,650 (2003) (discussing the basics of imaging and summarizing the work
of James, Spencer, and Gordon Allport that shifted the paradigm for thinking about the
source of human behavior in many of its most important aspects).
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perhaps never fully elaborated-is nonetheless more widely understood
than at any time in human history. We know at least this with
certainty: Everything-everything-we perceive, know, feel, and sense
emanates from the brain. Much of the new data affirm our sense of self.
But some do not. We should look into those matters and take seriously
the observation of Robert Sapolsky, who notes that many of the findings
from neuroscience "must challenge our sense of self."
This Article, which introduces Mercer's 2010 Symposium edition,
reports on some of the possibilities-and some of the dreams-from the
research that supports the assertion that we should take cognizance of
this new knowledge of ourselves. Others will share information about
the admissibility of imaging evidence, about its potential for teasing out
invisible biases, about the use of fMRI technology to determine some of
the neural correlates of behavior, about the potential of neuroscientific
data to unlock some of the hidden bases of our norms, and, finally, about
the tricky use of imaging evidence to mitigate punishment in the death
penalty context. Other articles will try to bring us up to date on the
many advances in the brain sciences and present a somewhat skeptical
approach to the law and neuroscience projects.
This report is mostly descriptive, reflecting the basic nature of the
brain sciences, but it is not entirely descriptive. The modest normative
claim made is that we should review some of the new findings from the
brain sciences with a willingness to ask whether they belong in
discussions about the sources that inform our normative discussions
about criminal law and punishment. This Symposium will bring some
of these questions into greater public focus. I am, of course, convinced
that findings from the brain sciences do belong in these conversations.
Bringing this data into the discussion will require us to take into
account more fully than we do now the limitations that many among us
are condemned to suffer. This addition to our conversation should
conduce to greater compassion in criminal law, which is, and will always
be, good for us as a polity.
What neuroscience tells us, in the broadest terms, is that measurements taken by the best available technology on virtually every capacity
and condition that our genotype is capable of expressing provide many

2.

Robert M. Sapolaky, The FrontalCortex and the CriminalJustice System, 359 PHIL.

TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B. 1787, 1787 (2004) (emphasis added) (arguing that

damage to the prefrontal cortext can produce individuals who know the difference between
right and wrong and are, nonetheless, "organically incapable of appropriately regulating
their behaviour").

2011]

FOREWORD

707

useful insights into the answer to this basic ontological question.' From
this perspective-generously defined to include neuroscience, neuropsychology, behavioral genetics, evolutionary psychology, cognitive
psychology, and genetic ecology-many traits are graphically distributed
as a bell-shaped curve. The implications of that distribution, from a
4
policy perspective, are not now fully satisfied in our criminal law.
As a metaphor, the standard distribution graph is often associated-and justly-with racial animus, and it is, for this reason, rightly
derided. We have tended to politicize the questions we ask of our
genotypes. My own view is to urge care in the short term, to be
cautiously optimistic in the mid term, and very optimistic in the long
run. The last part of our brain to develop-the cerebral cortex-is far
more contemplative than the early parts-the mechanisms of our "fight
or flight" survival ontogeny. And our commitment to compassion is a
lagging development.
Although the phrase "bell-shaped curve" is initially off-putting, its
misuse in the past is obviously not predictive. The standard distribution, when applied to the human genome, is shorthand for the dispersal
of many varied mechanisms and processes that generate the many
midpoints along continua that define our human capacities. It is
especially explanatory for angry, heinous crimes. Differences in
functions as widely varying as nano-quantities of neurotransmitters and
hormones that flow through our brains and blood streams seem to
generate unwelcome conduct as a function of post-birth exposure to
exceptionally harsh conditions.' Thus, some among us will necessarily
fail to meet our social norms. Vitally, though, we have the power to
effect some shifts in the distributive midpoints of our various capacities
toward a more compassionate and progressive direction; this direction
could raise the capacities of the least well-off among us, along with
everyone else.'

3. For a useful discussion of behavioral genetics, one aspect of the brain sciences, see
Owen D. Jones, Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBs.
81 (2006).
4. See generally Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and BehavioralBiology,
105 CoLUM. L. REv. 405, 408 (2005) (suggesting the law's standard account of human
behavior "overlooks essential components of causation that underlie [human] behaviors").
5. I have addressed this problem in How (Some) CriminalsAre Made, in 13 LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 2010 171 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). An earlier

version of the article is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421868 (posted June 18,
2009).
6. If this sounds like an effort to combine Rawlsian thinking with contemporary
neuroscience, it does so because it is such an effort. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, An
Essay on Liberalism and Public Theology, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 229 (1999-2000).
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If this assessment is even approximately accurate, then we should
think seriously about Sapolsky's observation and, when appropriate,
propose challenging new ideas in response to it. Individuals who
support the findings from the various disciplines that constitute the
brain sciences seem to bear a burden of expression, one committed to
refocusing public discourse. To that end, at least four basic questions
merit our consideration. First-the principal subject of this Article-what
do we know about the relationship between intentional harmful actions
and genetic/neurobiological deficiencies? Second, if some among us are
condemned to suffer neurobiological and behavioral deficits, are they also
susceptible to socially desirable rehabilitative interventions? If so, what
are those interventions, and what must we do to adopt them? And if
not, then what? Third, what are the sources of our sometimes conflicting
evolutionary urges? On the one hand, we know that some people who
suffer neurobiological deficits that conduce to crime do commit crimes,
and sometimes they are heinous. For those crimes, however, at least
some actors may not bear responsibility. On the other hand-and equally
urgent-we have a necessary adaptive need to constrain them and
sometimes to forgive them (although the latter is another lagging
indicator). Last, what adjustments can we make to change the norms
we use in our criminal law to reflect the new knowledge gained in the
brain sciences and to effect positive changes in human behavior? Some
of these questions are addressed here.
This Article intends to develop a theme of compassionate progressivism in the context of neuroscience and criminal law.' This Article
maintains that the brain sciences have added, and will continue to add,
new and potentially useful sources of explanation for human behavior.
Thus, the Article discusses the model of human behavior that our law
now embraces, according to which virtually everyone possesses the
capacity (gross and verifiable psychopathology excepted)' to make

7.

See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes

Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON B. 1775 (2004).

8. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), all questions relevant to the defenses of
insanity, duress, and others address issues of extraordinary individual vulnerability-cognitive failure, complete volitional failure, fear, and (at least historically) perceptions
about the (mostly male) individual's extraordinary vulnerability to certain settings-may
be taken into account only under the standard of gross and verifiable. As to general
questions of volition, however, the MPC drafters illogically and with some neurobiological
naivet6, declared "an unwillingness to vary legal norms with the individual's capacity to
meet the standards they prescribe, absent a disability that is both gross and verifiable."
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2 ("Stark, tangible factors that differentiate the actor from
another, like his [or her] size, strength, age, or health, would be considered in making the
exculpatory judgment.").
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responsible choices, nigh all the time. This conventional wisdom reflects
a brilliant illustration of genotype and historical experiences that shape
our intuitions and work together to constrain ourselves in the interest
of long-term species survival; however, it is incomplete. As a liberal
society committed generally to a progressive view of history, we must be
prepared to make necessary adjustments in the interest of a more
compassionate way of life. This Article traces findings from the brain
sciences, constrained by the metrics of the various disciplines that fall
under that umbrella, and findings applied to criminal law. These
findings indicate that we have the potential for bringing more compassion to our substantive criminal law; thus, we are capable of producing
a marginally safer society-one that yields to a fuller understanding of
both who we are and what we are capable of achieving.
Toward those ends, this Article is divided into five sections. Section
I presents a sketch of the prevailing dualist model of human behavior
that still supports Anglo-American criminal law. The sketch situates the
issues raised here within the jurisprudence of Anglo-American criminal
law, and, in particular, our understanding of the roles of choice and
character in punishment theory. I suggest that this focus on choice
versus character reflects a false dichotomy; our decisions always reflect
both, and neither is invulnerable to the vicissitudes of genetic expression.
With a benchmark established, Section II begins by setting out some
of the major assumptions of the neuroscience, behavioral genetics, and
evolutionary psychology that inform this Article. Section II then
provides a brief synthesis of the selectional model of human behavior
that is, in one form or another, broadly embraced by brain science
researchers. A review of a fair sample of this exciting research
generates the incontestable conclusion that each individual's unique
environment (nurture) interacts with and thereby acts upon the
individual's phenotype (nature) in an ongoing process that produces each
unique individual. The environment, coupled with individual neurobiological differences, can bring about negative, unwelcome behaviors, but
it also produces positive benefits for all individuals.
Next, Section III suggests both the limits and promises of current
findings in neuroscience, a recurrent theme of this Symposium.
Although neuroscience and the tools of brain imaging are sufficiently
well developed to evidence our neurobiology in remarkable detail
(roughly the size of a grain of rice or less), which was unimaginable until
a decade or two ago, they are not yet adequately developed to be useful
in the guilt phase of most criminal trials. Neuroimaging may and
sometimes does serve to mitigate punishment in the sentencing phase
of capital crimes, but in that setting the introduction of such evidence is
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always double-edged.9 Imaging techniques are by their very nature,
however, sufficiently well-developed today to effect some global
substantive and procedural changes in our norms, including those
related to burdens of proof, the definition of competency, and the
availability of some defenses. Kathryn Kaseo and Emily C. Paavolanl
will discuss this latter idea in the context of their hands-on, deathpenalty work.
Finally, Section IV presents a normative case for beginning to
overcome important primary barriers to achieving more compassionate
ends in substantive criminal law, notwithstanding the damage some
among us have suffered. Overcoming such barriers is largely a matter
of bringing a major long-term commitment to a public policy in
synchrony with a thickly described, publicly-shared commitment to a
secular and more genuinely natural theology. Insofar as we reduce
recidivism, we will be better off in the long run.
I.

THE CARTESIAN MODEL AND CRIMINAL LAW

I have just convinced myself that nothing whatsoever existed in the
world, that there was no sky, no earth, no minds, and no bodies; have
I not thereby convinced myself that I did not exist? Not at all; without
doubt I existed if I was convinced [or even if I thought anything]. . . .
I am, I exist, is necessarily true every time that I pronounce it or
conceive it in my mind.12

Some Background

A.

Most of us are familiar with at least part of Descartes' quote. In his
metaphysics, Descartes' view of humankind rested in part on a kind of
disembodied mind. Following the Platonic tradition, he dispatched the
corporeal body to the periphery when it came to accounting for what

makes a human life worthwhile: "And we also find so many other things
in the mind itself which can contribute to the clarification of its nature,

9. Imaging is also used fairly routinely to illustrate brain damage in civil litigation.
See 0. Carter Snead,Neuroimagingand the "Complexity" ofCapitalPunishment,82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1265, 1291-93 (2007) (surveying cases that have admitted imaging in civil litigation
and discussing the double-edged nature of neuro-imaging in the death penalty context).
10. Kathryn Kase, Transcript:Afternoon Session, 62 MERCER L. REV. 769 (2011).
11. See infra Emily C. Paavola & John H. Blume, Life, Death, and Neuroimaging:The
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Defense's Use of Neuroimages in Capital Cases-Lessons from the Front, 62 MERCER L. REV. 909 (2011).
12.

RENE DESCARTES, Second Meditation, in MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 23,

24 (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., 2d rev. ed. 1960).
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that those which depend on the body ... hardly deserve to be taken into
account.""3
The Cartesian approach to self-knowledge has held some sway for well
over three centuries. Nevertheless, at least since William James first
published THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY"' in 1890, researchers have
understood (or had access to information indicating) that the traditional
Cartesian view of the mind, conceived as a lone navigator controlling
mental functions, was premised on faulty biology." The Cartesian
theory lent itself to the intuition, shared by adults and children alike,
that within our skulls resides a central processing mechanism with the
power to preview our relations with and thoughts about the world-our
intentions-and then push the mental buttons (or, later, run a computer
program) that produce the appropriate unified vision of the world and
our response to it. Our intentions, merely kept alive by the body, direct
all interactions between the individual and the world at large. Our
bodies thus exist to house the mind and it is our bejeweled mind alone
that controls our choices.
Locke rejected Descartes's intuition-driven metaphysics in favor of an
empiricism premised on observation and learning. Locke's work
nonetheless fed the Cartesian misunderstanding of the incorporeal mind
through the familiar tradition of tabula rasa-the mind as a "blank
slate." This view holds that humans are born devoid of ideas; ideas and
ideation come only with experience."e Committed to Newtonian physics
and its new way of sensing the world, and disdainful of the Cartesian
notion of "innateness" (a view seen as inimical to the mathematical
world introduced by Newton and his contemporaries), Locke rejected the
idea of a special hands-on divine creation and moved to a converse view:
ideas work through primary and secondary human qualities that then
imprint themselves on human brains." As an approach to social

13. Id. at 32. Descartes's approach was not, in fact, disembodied. He located the point
of interaction between the body and mind in the pineal gland. See Gert-Jan Lokhorst,
Descartes and the Pineal Gland, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Spring 2009), http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/pineal-gland.
14. WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY (1890).
15. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN 247-52 (1994); GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE: ON THE
MATTER OF THE MIND 36-37 (1992); JOHN G. TAYLOR, THE RACE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 11314 (1999).
16. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 5-6
(2002).
17. See HARRY PROSCH, THE GENESIS OF TWENTIETH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY 84-88 (1964)

(explaining the Lockean distinction between those qualities that exist physically at the
atomic level and those that exist as perceptions of such matters in human minds).
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epistemology, Locke's views served then contemporaneous, intellectual,
and political philosophies that denied "any differences we see among
races, ethnic groups, sexes, and individuals"; all such differences could
be accounted for based on differences in experience."
Locke was only half right. Unfortunately, the important insight-that
individuals may possess different capacities that can be accounted for
only biologically-was, at least in some instances, anathema and, for
many historical reasons, remains so in contemporary culture." We are
all viewed as capable of being conditioned by experience; thus, we are
capable of controlling our destinies. This is not, however, entirely the
case. 20
The behaviorists of the first half of the twentieth century continued
the trend toward a belief in universal "conditionability."2 1 For the
behaviorist, all mental activities are reducible to behaviors per se or to
dispositions to certain behaviors. To display trait a is to engage in a or
to be disposed to a-ing. Thus, to exhibit sadness, anger, or happiness is
to engage in sad, angry, or happy behavior or possess an occurrent
disposition to the same,22 which can be modified or conditioned by the
use of appropriate behavioral techniques. Latter day behaviorists-functionalists-do not deny the existence of either mental operations
or the mind.
Contemporary functionalists simply claim that the mind is indistinguishable from any other information processing machine. As John

18. PINKER, supra note 16, at 6.
19. One has only to recall the outrage engendered by suggestions that AfricanAmericans and Caucasians may differ in athletic or intellectual ability based on some
native qualities, or that women may not be as well suited to math and science as males.
See, e.g., Marcella Bombardieri, HarvardWomen's Group Rips Summers, BoSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 19, 2005, http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2005/01/19/har
vard womensoup rips summers. These subjects are taboo. The response to RICHARD
J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES A. MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICA IN LIFE (1994), is characteristic: Their suggestion that there might
be inherent differences in intelligence was greeted not so much as bad science, which seems
to be the case, but as racist. See, e.g., Oliver R. Goodenough, Biology, Behavior, and
CriminalLaw: Seeking a ResponsibleApproach to an Inevitable Interchange,22 VT. L. REV.
263, 271-72, 278-79 (1997).
20. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 cmt. 1, at 215 (Official Draft and Commentaries 1985) (defining "voluntary" in a way that refuses to "inject into the criminal law
questions about determinism and free will").
21. See PINKER, supra note 16, at 19. As John B. Watson declared, "Give me a dozen
healthy infants .. . and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to
... train [them] to become any type of specialist I might select-doctor, lawyer,. . . and yes,
even beggar-man." Id.
22. JOHN R. SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY: PHILOSOPHY IN THE REAL WORLD
46(1998).
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Searle notes, mental states from this perspective actualize a certain kind
of causal relationship; that is to say, a mental state is "any state of a
physical system ... that stands in the right causal relations to input
stimuli, to other functional states of the system, and to output behavior."' Building on a behaviorist foundation, contemporary functionalists describe meaning as what in the end comes of a string of symbols
that reflects various sensory inputs that are transformed into output
according to a formal system, which operates without regard to
content.' On this telling, to be angry is to be in a state that is caused
by a particular sort of stimulation to nerve endings (of one sort or
another) that energize feelings of anger. Manipulate the symbols and
you manipulate the person's conduct. Life is reduced to algorithmic
processes that produce certain predictable corresponding emotions.
The take-home point here is that the model of human behavior that
drives much of contemporary criminal law and related public policy is
still informed by a view of human behavior that denies significant
differences in cognitive and volitional abilities based on human biology.
Moreover, the standard distribution of capacities necessarily implies
unequal capacities. As noted, in the legal domain everyone is deemed
capable of making appropriate decisions in the absence of gross and
verifiable psychopathology. Unarticulated in this view are assumptions
about conditionability, character, and choice. All appearances to the
contrary notwithstanding, killers like Jeffrey Dahmer, Andrea Yates,25
Robert Alton Harris,26 and the like are deemed competent and prima
facie viewed as "sane" because they can effect a practical syllogism and
"know" (at some points in time) that killing is wrong. Thus, they can
move from a current desire to belief (about how to effectuate that desire)
and then to an action that effects the desire." For that reason, we
reach the legal conclusion that, but for their evil character, they could
have chosen otherwise.

23. Id.
24. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at 222-23.
25. Andrea Yates is the Houston mother who drowned her five young children with the
hope that doing so would provide for their salvation. See Transcript of Andrea Yates's
Confession: June 20, 2001, 10 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 87 (2003), available at
http*//www.law.duke.edu/journals/djglp/downloads/genlOp87.pdf.
26. Robert Harris committed senseless brutal murders of two teenagers who offered
him a ride. See Charles M. Sevilla & Michael Laurence, Thoughts on the Cause of the
PresentDiscontents:The Death Penalty Case of Robert Alton Harris,40 UCLA L. REV. 345
(1992).
27. See Michael S. Moore, The Moral and Metaphysical Sources of the Criminal Law,
in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 11, 16-23 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1985).
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Choice and Character-AFalse Dualism

This section begins with a description of the Kantian substructure for
a theory of choice in the law, then considers the choosing system
described by H.L.A. Hart.28 Thereafter, it discusses character theory,
a lineage that begins with Aristotle and runs through Hume and beyond,
and posits that we choose our characters and, therefore, we choose to be
criminals. Both positions highlight the fallacy of dualism; thus, they
assume that a clear division exists when none does.'
1. Choice as a Moral Imperative.so
(a) Kant's Groundwork. The role of rationality and autonomy in our
moral deliberations, as with much else in moral theory, traces its
modern origins to Kant." The commitment to rationality in contemporary normative ethics, and the nature of the reasoning it employs,
begins, at least popularly, with the GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC
OF MORALS.32 Kant articulated his starting point by asking, "Do we not
think it a matter of the utmost necessity to work out for once a pure
moral philosophy completely cleansed of everything that can only be
empirical and appropriate to anthropology?"" That it was possible to
construct a moral philosophy based upon "pure thinking," altogether a
priori and outside quotidian human psychology, was taken as an
incontrovertible fact. Kant contended that "in matters of morality,
[human behavior can] be easily brought to a high degree of accuracy and
precision even in the most ordinary intelligence."
For present
purposes, it is enough to appreciate that Kant's commitment to

28.

On the extent to which Hart's views still pervade criminal law, see SANFORD H.

KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND

MATERIALS 536 (7th ed. 2001) (discussing the assumption of free will and rejection of
determinism).
29.

False Dilemma/Bifurcation Fallacy, LOGICAL FALLACIES, http//www.logicalfalla

cies.infolpresumption/false-dilemma (last visited April 3, 2011).
30. For a discussion of this material in greater detail, see Theodore Y. Blumoff, A
Jurisprudencefor PunishingAttempts Asymmetrically, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 951, 963-71
(2003).
31. Certainly our commitment to the dominance of reason and rationality goes back to
the Greeks and early Hebrews. See, e.g., Plato, Crito,in GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO 447,

450 (Eric H. Warmington & Philip G. Rouse eds., W.H.D. Rouse trans., Mentor 1984) ("[Mly
way is and always has been to obey no one and nothing, except the reasoning which seems
to me best when I draw my conclusions.").
32.

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (H.J. Paton trans.,

Harper Perennial 2009) (1948).
33. Id. at 57.
34. Id. at 59.
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rationality was wholly formal; thus, how individuals conduct themselves
in fact is literally beside the point. The normative/descriptive division
was complete.
Kant's formal commitment to a foundation for morality required that
he assume the profoundly unempirical conclusion that luck could have
no impact on the will:
A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes-because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good
through its willing alone-that is, good in itself.... Even if, by some
special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of stepmotherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its
intentions; ... even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own
sake as something which has its full value in itself. Its usefulness or
fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value.'
When the categorical goodness of will represents reason/autonomy's
raison d'etre, and thus exists independent of the world, it produces a
view of morality that is impervious to causative laws.36 The will
literally exists apart from reality."
GROUNDWORK is neurobiologically innocent: its message is simply that
reaching good is within us. Its continuing vitality in the jurisprudence
of our criminal law is, of course, subject to question. We know as a
matter of common observation and behavioral genetics, for example, that
events, conditions, and occurrences-in fact, all of one's experiences and
many experiences over which actors have no control-impact everything
we do every time we act.' Hume understood this point when he noted
that "[niature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end
Consider the ordinary
over any abstract reasoning whatsoever."
make-up, our initial
genetic
our
the
point:
incidents of birth to realize

35. Id. at 62.
36. BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck:A Postscript,in MAIUNG SENSE OF HUMANITY AND
OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: 1982-1993 241, 241 (1995).

37. I am not suggesting that Kant was unconcerned with practical ethics; he was. Even
here, however, Kant was convinced that no one could be forced to do that which his will
opposes. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 27-33 (Louis Infield trans.,
1963).
38. Cacioppo et al., supra note 1, at 650.
39. DAVID HUME, ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNING
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 41 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press
3d ed. 1975) (1777). In what reads like a direct challenge to Kant, Hume disputes the
distinction between reasoning and experience, arguing that the former gives form to the
latter. Reasoning is the process of making sense of our experience and not the "result of
our intellectual faculties, which, by considering &priori the nature of things, [somehowl
examin[es] the effects[] that must follow from their operation." Id. at 43-44 n.1.

716

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

socio-economic circumstances, our access to and use of prenatal and
perinatal care, our introduction (or not) to moral and religious values,
and substantial components of our personality-all are determined in
whole or in part at the moment of conception and not long thereafter.o
These conditions are largely a matter of moral luck." We do not choose
our biological parentage and all that comes therewith, nor do we choose
the environments into which we are born. Moreover, we know that all
of the events, conditions, and occurrences one faces throughout life can
bring about lasting changes in one's development.4 2 The impact of such
phenomena on one's penchant for crime seems too undeniable to disguise
under any settled view. Our jurisprudence, however, seems to take this
measure of a human into account only in the capital sentencing
phase-after conviction of capital crimes-and even then its usefulness is
always potentially undermined. Sometimes making the right choice is
beyond the grasp of many damaged individuals.
(b) Hart's "Choosing System." Like Kant before him (but from a
utilitarian's perspective), Professor H.L.A. Hart generally assumed that
virtually everyone has the capacity and opportunity to choose good."'
In his famous critique of determinism, Hart asked his readers to view
the law as "a choosing system, in which individuals can find out, in
general terms at least, the costs they have to pay if they act in certain
ways." The conception of choice implicates directly the compatibilist
view of the will spawned by Kant.4 s Hart's analysis began by noting
that individuals make choices routinely and predict future events as "a
matter of empirical fact, and no form of 'determinism', [sic] of course, can
show this to be false or illusory."46 The determinist claim, according to

40. See, e.g., EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at 174 (noting that human
organisms arrive more or less adapted to our environment in a process that occurs even
when the environment springs surprises on us).
41. See THOMAS NAGEL, Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 24, 25-26 (1979).
42. See generally DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 15, at 11; JEFFREY M.
SCHWARTZ & SHARON BEGLEY, THE MIND & THE BRAIN: NEUROPLASTICITY AND THE POWER

OF MENTAL FORCE (2002) (discussing efforts to reprogram patients suffering with
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder).
43. "Generally" is a necessary qualifier because Hart also understood that many
individuals lack the capacity-whether in virtue of deficient intelligence or education-to
make what the rest of society considers a "reasonable" decision. On the need to
individualize justice in a way that accounts for non-pathological deficits, see H.LA. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 136-57 (1968).

44. Id. at 44. For an elaboration on this point, see Blumoff, A Jurisprudencefor
Punishing,supra note 30, at 967-71.
45. JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 277-90 (Barbara
Herman ed., 2000).
46. HART, supra note 43, at 46 (emphasis added).
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Hart, consists of two moves: First, determinism posits that human
behavior is "subject to certain types of law" (although this has not been
shown to be true).47 Second, if determinism could be shown to be the
case, then the distinction the law draws between acting or not acting
under excusing conditions evaporates as "unimportant, if not absurd.""
To rebut the determinist's claim, Hart describes the planning and
execution of a testamentary devise to illustrate his position."' When
a testator makes a will and the estate is administered posthumously
thereunder, the testator has in a real sense "causedthe outcome of the
distribution made."50 Hart acknowledges that the terms of the will
issue from "a complex set of conditions, of which all the other members
were as necessary for the production of the outcome as his choice."
He also notes that (1) the set of conditions that led to the choice is
composed of conditions the full scope of which we may never know; thus,
(2) the testator's choice itself was the product "of some set of ...
sufficient conditions" of which we are ignorant.52 Even assuming (1)
and (2) are correct, however, Hart insists (3) that these factors neither
falsify the testator's knowledge that he can make a choice to determine
the distribution nor undermine the pleasure the testator receives from
making the choices. If determinism cannot show statement (3) to be
false or illusory, Hart concludes, "I for one do not understand how it
could affect the wisdom, justice, rationality, or morality of the system we
are considering."1
Hart's view reflects a kind of binary theory of utility. He concedes
that determinism exists as a "set of . .. sufficient [causal] conditions,"
the full array of which we cannot explicate," but he argues for proceeding as if it did not." This view of determinism accepts that events
have antecedent causes but holds that in an important, inexplicable

47. Id. at 29.
48. Id.
49. For an elaboration on this point, see Blumoff, A Jurisprudencefor Punishing,supra
note 30, at 967-71.
50. HART, supra note 43, at 46.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. CompareAlan Norrie, Freewill, Determinismand CriminalJustice,3 LEGAL STUD.
60, 62 (1983), and John L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of
Responsibility in the Law: A PhilosophicalAnalysis, 76 GEo. L.J. 2045, 2056 (1988), with
Michael S. Moore, Causationand the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1092 (1985) (acknowledging the pressure of determinist forces but arguing "that moral responsibility for an
action should be ascribed to an actor even when that action was caused by factors over
which he had no control").

718

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

manner agents control their own mental states, even though some (or
all) of those states are themselves causally determined.56 Although in
a practical sense I will not challenge Hart's position, at least one
question still has to be asked: Did Hart pose the right question? Others
have argued that the important question Hart asks is not whether
human behavior is subject to scientific laws, that much is conceded.
Rather, Hart asks "whether. . . human behavior can be seen as caused
by conditions external to the will of the actor,"" thereby placing the
burden on the observer to demonstrate that the neurobiology of behavior
is contrary to Hart's compatibilist perception. In contrast to this burdenshifting question, one can reply that not only can events be seen as
caused by conditions external to the will, we know that events are
affected by external causes, a view Hart concedes." Thus, if it is
admitted that under some description (for example, theoretical reasoning) there are exogenous conditions that determine an individual's
conduct in some important way, then Hart's critique, like those of almost
everyone else, can be viewed as suffering some question-begging.
Nor will it do to argue that choices exist because a gun pressed to the
temple of a pedophile, for example, would prevent pedophilia; the
pedophile would exercise choice and control.59 That natural operates
to put survival near the top of every being's motivational list is
understood by everyone. The fear of death operates to inhibit conduct
in any sensate creature if the conduct is in any way inhibitable. This
conclusion is not merely based on the fact that individuals are guided by
reason and, therefore, wrongdoers can forego unwelcomed conduct simply
by using those processes to inhibit proposed or intended actions. From
this perspective, virtually no misconduct short of the worst imaginable
psychopathology deserves any exculpation. We acknowledge exculpation
based on duress, for example, which is not pathological conduct. If a gun
to the head were the baseline for determining volitional control, we
should provide sufficient resources and exercise the will to inflict fear of
death on the convicted pedophile. Perhaps we can also prevent bears or
wolves from eating or reproducing. With sufficient force or threats we

56. Hill, supra note 55, at 2052 n.27. Hill also attributes to "soft determinist[s]" the
notion that free action is absent only if an agent is caused to act against his will. Id. at
2052 n.28; accord Norrie, supra note 55, at 66 (describing freedom, in Hart's scheme, as
"the ability to follow one's desires no matter what their causes might be.").
57. Norrie, supra note 55, at 61 (emphasis added).
58. HART, supra note 43, at 153-54 (likening the objective standard used in criminal
negligence to absolute liability in cases when the defendant lacks capacity).
59. Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 185 (2006); Stephen J.Morse, CrazyReasons, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 189, 213 (1999).
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can prohibit virtually any conduct that we, as a society, have the will to
prohibit (excretion, sleep, and death excepted).
The move from rationality to deterrence, however, works in many
ways. It cannot be a sufficient factor that the person, unlike the bear or
wolf, understands language and has some capacity for reason. That
could mean that all species that understand communicated signals
triggering fear reactions can be deterred, which assumes the very
proposition at issue-that some capacity is both necessary for effective
deterrence (fear of death) and sufficient without incurring the costs that
such a policy entails. What is the sufficient capacity for effective,
affordable deterrence to work is precisely the question at issue.
To be clear, no serious neuroscientist (or any other sober observer)
advocates opening the prison doors and permitting violent crazy people
to run free on the roads. Punishment is not procedural or mechanical
in the way that the burden of proof is or that evidentiary standards of
causation are, although these standards can be dispositive in many
cases. Punishment is substantive. Very few occasions grab an
individual's attention as quickly and tightly as does the emotional pain
of incarceration (the bars being slammed closed behind him), and we
need to cease viewing the legal universe as binary-guilty or not guilty,
free will or determinism, yes or no. The universe is simply not
categorical; the universe is at all times continuous. Dualist thinking
tends to distort our view of the world. As Sapolsky points out, "scientists typically struggle to think in continua, a style that is a logical
extension of thinking probabilistically. 60 This is especially true in
psychological disciplines "where, for example, there is a smooth genetic
continuum between schizophrenia, a disorder of wildly disruptive
delusional thinking, and schizotypalism, in which there are far milder
'metamagical' delusions."1 The capacities that make up our beings
exist on a continua, including our personality types; these capacities do
not exist in neatly confined boxes.
This is not to say that we can avoid all efforts at line-drawing because
we cannot. It is to say, however, that where we draw those lines is our
choice, and the choices we make are not written on stone tablets. The
major point is that we have an obligation as humans to demonstrate our
good character when we draw those lines so that everyone who is
capable of rehabilitation should have a genuine opportunity to achieve
that goal.

60. Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1789.
61. Id.
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In NICOMACHEAN ETHICS,62 Aristotle

insists that each individual is responsible for his own character because
his actions establish that character." Hume advanced a similar idea
to account not only for the source of our actions, but also for our
reactions to the conduct of others: "Actions are by their very nature
temporary and perishing, and where they proceed not from some cause
in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them,
they . . . can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if

evil."' Hume elaborated a dispositional (as opposed to a situational)
viewpoint with an example of homicide.
Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance.
Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact,....
which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only
certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other
matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you ... till you
turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of
disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action.... It lies in
yourself, not in the object.'
On this view, we disapprove of vicious conduct not because it is vicious;
rather, we identify it as vicious because we, in turning to our own
dispositions (our "breast[s]"), disapprove of it.67 Morality, Hume tells
us, resides in us, in our characters and dispositions. Such a determination would be relatively unimpeachable if all who are judged "bad"
possessed control-in-fact over their characters.
One author follows the Aristotelian-Humean line and argues for a
rule-utilitarian theory" of excuses according to which moral demerit is

62. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729
(Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1984).
63. Id. at 1758 (maintaining that by virtue of their slackardly dispositions, men are
'responsible for becoming men of that kind"). For a neurologically-informed critique of this
view, see CARL ELLIoT, THE RULES OF INSANITY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 29-31 (1996) (noting "that in many ways we are clearly not
responsible for our characters, at least not as completely as Aristotle implies").
64. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 411 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., New York,
MacMillan & Co. 1888) (emphasis added).
65. For an elaboration on this basic social science distinction, see Theodore Y. Blumoff,
The Problems with Blaming, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 127 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R.
Goodenough eds., 2009).
66. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 64, at 468-69.
67. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 50 (1996).
68. For a discussion on rule-utilitarian thought, see John Rawls, Rule Utilitarianism,
in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 82 (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972)
(distinguishing between justifications for the practice of punishment generally, and its
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judged by the following dictum: "An agent is morally blameworthy. . .
for an act if, and to the degree that, the moral code the currency of which
in that society would maximize utility would condemn ... him for it
...

. "

Condemnation is appropriate, therefore, whenever the actor

lacks an internalized motivational set that produces (or should produce)
appropriate feelings of guilt, shame, or dishonor in response to conduct
that violates the moral code, absent a traditional assessment of excuse.
Motivation is key; thus, an agent's conduct is excusable if, but only if,
"an objectively wrong action (or an action in some way out of order). . .
does not manifest some defect of character."o Brandt's description of
character, which he distinguishes from a mere "trait of personality,""
is terse: it is some internal quality that goes beyond a trait to include
more or less permanent dispositions. For Brandt, the crucial moral
question is whether "people would be trained to be motivated, and to
feel, in certain ways about certain things-namely, to have an aversion
to breaking a promise, to feel guilty about doing so," that is, to act
according to utility-maximizing rules of conduct.7 2 Implicit in this
approach is the Aristotelian-Humean belief that the explanation for
conduct reflecting character is internal to the actor and his desires, even
if neither is fully within his control. On Brandt's view, "a defect of
character is, or includes, a defect of motivation."" Presumably this

particular applications, and defending utilitarianism as an explanation for moral
judgments thereunder), and John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPosIUM 3, 9-10 (Sidney Hook ed., 1964) (defining the duty of

fair play as a scheme in which everyone benefits by mutual social cooperation and in which
everyone or nearly everyone accepts certain restrictions on liberty to enjoy the benefit
which is, in a sense, free, and stating conversely, a social arrangement is unstable insofar
as any person knows that he can fail to cooperate but still enjoy the benefit).
69. Richard B. Brandt, A UtilitarianTheory of Excuses, 78 PHIL. REV. 337, 353 (1969).
Although I believe the debate between character and choice theorists is, at best,
substantially overinflated, see, e.g., R.A. Duff, Choice, Character,and CriminalLiability,
12 LAw & PHIL. 345 (1993), I assume that character is a relevant factor in the search for
blame, especially when the issue of excusing misconduct arises. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.04 cmt., at 275 (noting that the excuse of mistake of law applies when the "act
charged is consistent with the entire law-abidingness of the actor"); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.3, at 55 (stating that provocation acknowledges that "one who kills in response to
certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating a significantly different
character deficiency than one who kills in their absence").
70. Brandt, supra note 69, at 354.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
73. Id. Brandt's survey of excusing conditions is fairly typical except insofar as he
presses the motivational button: "All the considerations traditionally recognized as
exculpating excuses are ones evidencing adequate motivation-or at least showing absence
of evidence of inadequate motivation." Id. at 357. Notably absent is serious consideration
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means that the actor could have learned appropriate conduct but failed
to do so because he lacked the appropriate motivational reinforcement.
Whether any particular individual could be so trained, in the sense that
he has adequate capacities for cognition and volitional control and has
had the opportunity to learn the same, is the question raised here, but
it is not an issue on which Brandt opines. 4
Brandt's view also reflects neurobiological innocence. No serious
scholar in the field of brain sciences doubts that genetic endowment, for
example, plays a substantial role in the construction of personality."
Yet it is precisely these developments that our jurisprudence is only now
beginning to take any cognizance of, and then generally only when the
ultimate sanction of death is at stake.76 The basic problem raised by

this view of character rests on the problematic assumption that all those
wrongdoers whom the law deems sane and competent, for example, have

both control over their character and that character in general is
relatively stable over time." Although the latter point is contest-

of volitional deficits or how they are acquired. In fact, his understanding of a motivational
defect begs the question how it came about: "For part of what it is to blame a person is to
impute a defect to him-and a defect is a dispositional feature of him, an incapacity or
deleterious tendency." Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). Whether this view of character is
anything other than an elaboration on the inability to do otherwise-to choose appropriately-has been questioned. J. Ralph Lindgren, CriminalResponsibilityReconsidered, 6 LAW
& PHIL. 89, 101-02 (1987) (arguing that under Brandt's approach to those who do not
manifest such a character defect are those who could not have done otherwise).
74. Cf Brandt, supra note 69, at 351-52 (stating that excuses entail societal costs
insofar as the wrongdoer or potential wrongdoer believes that the clever lawyer will help
him use the excuse to avoid incarceration).
75. See, e.g., Kenneth Taylor, On the Explanatory Limits of Behavioral Genetics, in
GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 117, 125-26 (David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit
eds., 2001) (summarizing data that suggest that some criminality reflects defects in an
individual's "basic cognitive or affective architecture"); David Wasserman & Robert
Wachbroit, Introduction: Methods, Meaning, and Morals, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL
BEHAVIOR, supra at 1, 12-13.
76. For a discussion on this issue in the context of a deficiency in a specific brain
enzyme, monoamine oxidase type A, which metabolizes certain neurotransmitters, see
Blumoff, How (Some) CriminalsAre Made, supra note 5.
77. Cf. ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN: FRONTAL LOBES AND THE
CIVILIZED MIND 150 (2001). Goldberg suggests that data from neuroscience require "[a]
new legal construct of 'inability to guide one's behavior despite the availability of requisite
knowledge' may be needed to capture the peculiar relationship between frontal lobe
dysfunction and the potential for criminal behavior." Id. Goldberg further describes a
phenomenon characterized by the "nonpathological diminution of the ability to form a
[common sense] theory of mind," such as the inability to sense how others are reacting
internally to us as reflecting normal variability in frontal lobe functioning. Id. at 108.
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able," assume for now that individual moral development goes through
stages and becomes more or less fixed in Kohlbergian terms at some
point in time with respect to at least some areas of conduct.7 ' Even if
this is correct, the point overlooks or dismisses as unimportant an
incontrovertible fact: Who we are at t, the moment of wrongdoing on
which we focus for rendering legal accounts, is a function of all the
antecedent influences that impact on the decision made at t. All such
influences play a formative role in decision-making although those roles
are not fully discernible in the aggregate." Nor will it do to claim, as
many do, that because determinism is universal and affects all of us the
prospect of determinism can be dismissed."' For now, suffice it to say
that "universal" is decidedly not the same as "uniform." We are each
affected uniquely: some for better, some for worse.82 This brute social

78. See John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and
Acquisition, 41 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 541-45 (1990) (discussing research on how
children learn moral rules); Yoram Shachar, The FortuitousGap in Law and Morality, 6
CRIM. JusT. ETHICS 12, 24 (1987) (surveying Piaget's work among others and speculating
"that human morality, once autonomously developed and formed, remains so for life in
some areas of conduct, while other authorities replace parental authority in other areas and
create in the human mind the same subservient nonautonomous opinion which is a mere
reflection of external manifestations of attitude by such authorities"). As noted in DANIEL
GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (10th Anniv. ed. 2006), "the neurological data suggest
[the existence of] a window of opportunity for shaping our children's emotional habits." Id.
at xxii.
79. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CRAIN, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS ch. 7 (1980) (discussing Kohlberg's stages of moral development), available
at http://faculty.plts.edu/gpence/html/Kohlberg.htm.
80. Bernard Williams makes this point about the instability of character judgments
made at, or in reference to, a fixed point in time, in terms of the criteria needed to make
such a determination:
[WIhat one does and the sort of life one leads condition one's later desires and
judgments. The standpoint of that retrospective judge who will be my later self
will be the product of my earlier choices. So there is no set of preferences both
fixed and relevant, relative to which the various fillings of my life-space can be
compared. If the fillings are to be evaluated by reference to what I variously . . .
want, the relevant preferences are not fixed, while if they are to be evaluated by
what I now ... want, this will give a fixed set of preferences, but one that is not
necessarily relevant.
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Moral Luck, in MORAL LuCKt PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980 20,
34 (1981).
81. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Moral Excess in the Law, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 63,
75-76 (2000); Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 52, at 1092 (arguing "that

moral responsibility for an action should be ascribed to an actor even when that action was
caused by factors over which he had no control").
82. This is a basic fact of our genes and neurobiology. See, e.g., MAT RIDLEY, NATURE
VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, & WHAT MAKES US HUMAN (2003). See generally
DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 15.
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fact of existence challenges our conception of freedom because the
conventional wisdom posits that "free action[s] should not be determined
by antecedent conditions, and should be fully explained only intentionally, in terms of justifying reasons and purposes."
Yet antecedent events and conditions obviously do matter greatly, and
everyone-yes, everyone-knows it.

Our well-nurtured intuitions shout

out this basic understanding routinely. Even our ordinary, everyday
usage underscores this fact. We routinely talk to our friends and
neighbors across fences about our genetic make-ups, including our
likenesses to Mom or Dad ("like father, like son," "the acorn never falls
far from the tree," and so on), to our sisters or brothers, and the
variations nature has carved out among our siblings. Findings from
behavioral genetics and neuroscience have, for the most part, provided
empirical support for our intuitions.
II.

THE VIEW FROM GENETICS, NEUROSCIENCE, AND LAW

Darwin's insight is simple, yet often misunderstood. It is this. ... [Ilf
only some of [a species] can survive, and if whatever helped them
survive is passed to their offspring, then the offspring will be better
adapted than their parents were. In this way the organisms become
designed, by the blind processes of copying and selection, for the
environment in which they live. As Dawkins puts it, if you have
variation, selection and heredity, then you must have evolution.'
Paul Bloom states that "[ilt is one of the oddest facts of nature that
the unfeeling process of natural selection can construct creatures who
themselves have feelings, who are sensitive to the pain of others, and
who can work to make the pain go away."'
Virtually everything else
either informs Darwinian selection or follows therefrom.
Up to this point, this Article has discussed the settled jurisprudential
understanding of individual moral psychology. Its predicate is formal
and its model reflects the belief that, literally, almost everyone has the
capacity and opportunity simply to choose good. Although it is an
overstatement to conclude, as Professor Hart did, that the law is a

83. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 115 (1986); see also THOMAS NAGEL,
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 'O PHILosoPHY 51 (1987).

84. Susan Blackmore, Meme, Myself I, NEW SCIENTIST, Mar. 13, 1999, at 40; cf PAUL
BLOOM, DESCARTES' BABY: How THE SCIENCE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT EXPLAINS WHAT
MAKES Us HUMAN 104 (2004) ("[Ihf there is variation in some trait, and this trait is passed
from parent to child, the variant that leads to more offspring will tend to win out.").

85. BLOOM, DESCARTES' BABY, supra note 84, at 123-24.
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"choosing system,"' no one doubts that the law hopes to influence
human behavior, and the criminal law expresses this hoped-for
deterrence advertently." The basis on which the law and lawmakers
make behavior-shaping preferences rests largely upon the theories of
human nature just summarized. Those theories require adjustment from
time to time. An assumption underlying this work is that, in general,
the broader the source of reasonable epistemic deference,' the better
Neuroscience,
prepared we are to make public-policy decisions.
behavioral genetics, and the brain sciences generally ought to be among
the sources that routinely inform our jurisprudence far more than they
do now, which is mostly limited to death-penalty litigation and the proof
(or lack thereof) of injury. This section offers several sketches that
frame the basic currents in the brain sciences.
Among the Most Basic Assumptions
After many years studying how phenotypes are expressed (by
examining the operation of our proximal sources of genetic inheritance),
we now know that the chromosomes we receive from our parents and all
the DNA therein are not composed simply of pre-impressed protein
producing strings of nucleotides. Rather, our genetic inheritances are
composed of the very stuff that generates open-ended selection-selection
on-the-ground, so to speak. This remarkable process both permits and
suffers us as individuals to adapt to our own unique environments. The
function of much of our DNA exists ready to respond to the environment,
whatever it brings. We are, in every way, the products of the fantastic
number of synergies that merge nature and nurture, and nurture and
nature, and so on and so on in endless interdependence. And we can
effect some changes for the betterment of all. On what bases does this
prediction rest? What follows is a list that includes many of the basic
assumptions upon which a rich variety of empirical research, and many
inferences therefrom, emerge.

A.

86. See supratext accompanying note 44. See generallyJones & Goldsmith, supra note
4, at 459-60, 468-75 (noting that the demand for good will and its availability are inversely
related, and that legal sanctions are often viewed as prices imposed on unwanted behaviors
with the hope of reducing their incidence).
87. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.01(2) (describing the purposes of the MPC's
provisions on sentencing and treatment); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt.
A2 (2010) (setting out the basic statutory mission of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2006)).
88. "Epistemic deference is the phenomenon in which one person uses the deliverances
of some information source, perhaps the opinions of another person, as a model for what
to believe." James M. Joyce, EpistemicDeference: The Case of Chance,107 PROc. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 187, 187 (2007).
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1. Human beings, like every species of every genus alive at any
time in earth's history, have evolved through the processes of
heredity, variation, and natural selection. This process reflects
millions of years of adaptation such that the basic architecture of
our anatomy and physiology is itself millions of years in the making.
Moreover, as creatures of heredity, variation, and natural selection,
maintaining "fitness"-the ability to reproduce our phenotypic
design-is a never-ending process."
2. Phenotypic expression in an unselected population-how our
genes express themselves in a population living in its natural
habitat-tends to be distributed in standard phenotypic fashion,
mutations expected.o
3. The brain (and the mind, if they are different) are also
products of this enormously complex process; they too generally
reflect functional adaptations-polymorphisms-to the environment
in which they evolved."1
4. The "psychological constituents of human ... nature, like
the anatomical and physiological elements thereof, exhibit adaptive
design for the solution of particularly recurrent problems faced by
our ancestors." Thus, decisions we make today are the product
of neurobiological mechanisms that were initially developed in a
primitive stage of human existence."

89.

For excellent introductions to this topic, see STEVE JONES, THE LANGUAGE OF

GENES: SOLVING THE MYSTERIES OF OUR GENETIC PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1995), and
MARK RIDLEY, THE COOPERATIVE GENE: How MENDEL'S DEMON EXPLAINS THE EVOLUTION
OF COMPLEX BEINGS (2001).
90. WILLIAM R. CLARK & MICHAEL GRUNSTEIN, ARE WE HARDWIRED? THE ROLE OF
GENES IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 88-92 (2000).
91. There are gaps between intention and neuronal firings that we may never eliminate
as sources of inquiry. See, e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, RATIONALITY IN ACTION ch. 3 (2001).
There is some evidence to conclude that the gap is filled, in part, by ion activity at the
quantum level. SCHWARTZ & BEGLEY, supra note 42, at ch. 8.

92.

Margo Wilson et al., An EvolutionaryPsychological Perspectiveon the Modulation

of Competitive Confrontationand Risk-Taking, in 5 HORMONES, BRAIN & BEHAVIOR 381,
381 (Donald W. Pfaff ed al., eds., 2002).
93. Owen D. Jones refers to this phenomenon as "time-shifted rationality," the idea
being that our ability to process our cultural experiences occurs in brains that evolved
under very different circumstances than we face today. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted

Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral
Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) (arguing that what we perceive as irrationalities
are often likely to be products of a temporal mismatch between the environment in which
natural selection shaped the brain to function and different, modern environments that
technology has only recently enabled us to study). I would add to Jones's general
description only that this shift in decision-making continues to occur within a selectional

system that includes both the ongoing temporal and shifting effects of natural selection and

2011]

FOREWORD

727

5. The basic morphology of our DNA includes architectural
designs in our neuroanatomy (our cerebral cortex and subcortical
mechanisms) and our neurophysiology (neurotransmitters, hormones
and their regulators, and the like) that are themselves the phenotypic outcome of our genotype as they respond to the actual
environments in which life occurs." It follows, then, "that two
identical genotypes, placed in two different environments, may
produce two quite different phenotypes with respect to any particular characteristic, behavioral or otherwise."
6. Notwithstanding the statements immediately above, it is
also the case that many of the features that constitute human
decision-making are inaccessible to us through introspection because
"the phenomenology of deliberation and reasoned choice is often
illusory and reconstructive." 6 The neurologist Michael Gazzaniga
makes a basic point that our jurisprudence and moral philosophy
would do well to understand and incorporate more fully:
Nowhere is the issue of [what constitutes] ourselves and our brain
more apparent than when we see how ineffectual the mind is at
trying to control the brain. In those terms, the conscious self is
like a harried playground monitor, a hapless entity charged with
the responsibility ofkeeping track of multitudinous brain impulses
running in all directions at once.'
7. Evolutionary theory, among other resources within biology
as a discipline, "can be useful in predicting, at least statistically,

how those effects operate neurobiologically (and on balance) to produce some outlying
standard deviation of the population who have or perceive themselves as having a small
chance of success, such as inclusive fitness.
94. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ & BEGLEY, supra note 42 (discussing efforts to reprogram
patients suffering with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder); DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR,
supra note 15, at 11.
95. CLARK & GRUNSTEIN, supra note 90, at 90.
96. WILSON ET AL., supra note 92, at 383.
97. MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE MIND'S PAST 23 (1998). For a similar view from social
psychology, see John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The UnbearableAutomaticity of
Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 462 (1999) (noting that most of our self-regulation, including
our perceptual apparatus and perceptions, lie outside conscious awareness). This is not to
say that our information processing is simply a helter-skelter, ad hoc affair; usually it is
not because we plan and introspect and use our cognitive resources in decision-making.
It is to claim, however, that our information-processing mechanisms are not entirely
apparent even when we attempt to introspect on how those mechanisms operate; we could
be better informed.
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both the environmental causes of [psychological brain] states and
the nature of the responses that are likely to follow."
8. Our conception of nature and nurture, often serving as far
more than a crude heuristic, is in need of substantial overhaul. In
fact, it has never been the case that either genes or the environment
drive human behavior. As Matt Ridley points out, "Genes are not
puppet masters.... They are active during life; they switch each
other on and off; they respond to the environment."99

B. Selection at Work: Open-endedness
These assumptions lead to the conclusion that evolution, including
natural selection, heritability, and variation (along with genetic drift,
and so forth), is an open-ended process that rests on a genomic structure
that is at once both fixed-we all share roughly 99.9% of the same
genome1 oo-and fluid. Even the once prevailing wisdom that the adult
brain is hard-wired and fixed, immune to change, is simply wrong.'0
Neuroplasticity-the ability of neurons in the brain to generate new
connections and rewire or remodel the brain-is never ending, although
it is sometimes more limited in adults than in children.102 Our genome
is fixed inasmuch as we humans share all but a tiny percentage of the
same DNA (-.01%), and it is fluid in that actual experiences are
reflected in how any given individual adapts to his or her unique
environment. The vehicle for these neuronal changes is genetic; they are
preset to react to the environment, whatever it might be.
This section begins with a discussion of the composition of our genome
and moves to the interdependence of "nature" and "nurture" in the
making of an individual. The terms nature and nurture are placed in
cautionary marks to suggest that although the dichotomy may yet
provide some heuristic benefits, those benefits come at the cost of a basic
misconception.

98.

Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 4, at 423.

99. RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note 82, at 6.
100. See, e.g., Daniel L. Hartl & Elizabeth W. Jones, ESSENTIAL GENETICS: A GENOMICS
PERSPECTIVE 244 (3d ed. 2002).
101. See, e.g., SCHwAmRZ & BEGLEY, supt note 42 (detailing the history of the
overthrow of the once conventional wisdom); ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE WISDOM PARADOX:
How YOUR MIND CAN GRow STRONGER AS YOuR BRAIN GROws OLDER (2005).
102. See, e.g., Sofie Heuninckx et al., Systems Neuroplasticity in the Aging Brain:
Recruiting Additional Neural Resources for Successful Motor Performance in Elderly
Persons,28 J. NEUROSCIENCE 91 (2008), availableat http://www.jneurosci.org/cgi/contentl
full/28/1/91.
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1. Our Genetic Makeup. Geneticists have uncovered stores of
fundamental data concerning the processes through which evolution by
natural selection occurs. We have known for some time that genes
provide the major vehicle through which natural selection operates."o3
One of the discoveries is that only 3% or less of our DNA is precommitted to phenotypic expression" the right number of fingers in
roughly the right place with the expected shape, the point at which
puberty begins, chins drop, hair grays, changes in the morphology of our
brains occur, and so on. There is, however, far more to the DNA within
us than that small percentage. 0 5 It turns out that some of that 97%+
we have previously labeled "junk DNA" is not junk at all.'06 At least
some of the rubble has among its constituents the precursors that might
enable us to move some of our distributed capacities in one direction or
another, even as the most minute variations can produce death and
destruction. It turns out that our genome operates with nature from
both the inside and the outside to shape who we are.
(a) From the Inside-Out.o' If you asked any cattle breeder in the
world if the sperm he purchases from different breeds of bull affects the
aggressive tendencies in his female milk-producing off-spring, the

103. See, e.g., RIDLEY, THE COOPERATIvE GENE, supra note 89, at ch. 9; MICHAEL R.
ROSE, DARwIN'S SPECTRE: EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY IN THE MODERN WORLD ch. 4(1998).

104. See, e.g., W. Wayt Gibbs, The Unseen Genome: Gems Among the Junk, 289 SCI.
AM. 46 (Nov. 2003) (putting the percentage of protein-coding DNA at 2%); John S. Mattick,
The Hidden Genetic Programof Complex Organisms,291 SCI. AM. 60 (Oct. 2004) available
at http://www.rpgroup.caltech.edul-natsirt/ME96/RNA-pdf; Gerton Lunter, Non-genic
Evolution and Selection in the Human Genome or: 'Junk DNA," DEP'T OF STAT.: UNIV. OF
OXFORD, http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/-hein/HumanGenome/hg.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2011)
(summarizing recent literature and putting the figure at 98.5%). Their potential
explanatory power is just now in the early stages of mining.
105. Of the roughly three billion chemical bases that compose a molecule of DNA, the
most commonly cited figure indicates that the human genome is roughly 99.9% identical
among all homo sapiens everywhere. See, e.g., Human Genetic Variation Fact Sheet,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF GENERAL MEDICAL SCIENCES, http://www.nigms.nih.gov/Publica
tions/FactsheetGeneticVariation.htm (last updated Mar. 22, 2011). Thus, of those three
billion base pairs (the familiar A-T and G-C) only a small percentage is actually code for
proteins that provide something akin to a blueprint. The rest were, until recently,
disparaged as "junk DNA."
106. See, e.g., Researchersfrom Stanford University,Departmentof BiologicalSciences
DescribeFindingsin Genetics & Genomics, LIFE ScI. WKLY., Apr. 24,2007, availabeat 2007
WLNR 7426550 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting that Stanford biologists have
concluded that "the presence of junk DNA ... might make an important contribution to
the evolution of complex organisms"); ScientistsExplore Function of 'JunkDNA,' SCI. DAILY
(Nov. 21, 2006), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2006111/061113180029.htm.
107. This section is adapted from RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note 82.
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breeder will identify you immediately as the neophyte your question
reveals. Ask a corn grower or the cultivator of any farm commodity if
the seeds she purchases for use in her soil affect plant productivity and
you will receive the same answer: "Well of course they do. Any darn
fool knows that much." The milk we drink and the meat and produce we
eat (and the insulin some among us use) are fabricated in part by
genetically-managed mammals and genetically-managed seeds. The
tendencies for aggressiveness and augmented yields have strong genetic
modules.
These genetic tendencies will come as no surprise to ornithologists.
They know, for example, that cuckoos migrating from North America to
Africa and back, singing and mating with a member of their own species,
do so despite the fact that they grow to adulthood without ever having
met a parent or sibling.os Certain traits and behaviors are either
instinctive or have very powerful instinctive features. To that extent,
some traits and behaviors do come from within.
In many ways, we humans are no different. Human twin studies
make important, and not easily contradicted, points about the sources
of human behavior. Consider the well replicated fact that monozygotic-identical-twins reared apart show a +.62 correlation on a survey of
religious attitudes and a +.69 correlation on political attitudes. They do
so under circumstances in which dizygotic-fraternal-twins reared apart
correlate at .02 and 0, respectively, on the same self-assessment
scales.'09 Thomas Bouchard, who has spearheaded much of this
research, makes a significant, counterintuitive point: even on features
of human conduct that most of us would likely classify as purely cultural
(or nurtured)-religious and political leanings, for example-there are

108. Id. at 52.
109. Id. at 79. It is clearly the case that studies using the tools of statistical analysis
of variance can overstate the effect of any single trait on an individual; heritability
measures population traits, not individual endowment. See, e.g., Elliott Sober, Separating
Nature and Nurture, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 75, at 47
(commenting that twin studies using analysis of variance understate the assumptions they
rest on). Nonetheless, the data provided in the text is impressive and worthwhile if
analytically inconclusive.
Importantly, though, it is not my intention to assess claims about the extent to which
genetic factors, in contrast with other factors, affect violent behavior. I do not advance a
reductionist program of the sort which claims "that certain phenomena-say, violent human
behavior-can be entirely explained by theories concerning apparently different phenomena." See, e.g., Robert Wachbroit, Understandingthe Genetics-of-Violence Controversy, in
GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 75, at 25, 32-33 (critiquing ontological
reductionism).
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genetic components implicated.1 o There is something in those variably long, alphabet strings of protein generators that tends to produce
certain attitudes and behaviors over which we may have little (or no)
control. The open issues of control include whether certain attitudes and
behaviors arise, whether they are desired when they do arise, and
whether once apparent and desired they can be contained. That said,
our genes do not generally operate alone.
(b) From the Outside-in. All of our attitudes and behaviors are not
fixed from within. If they were, we would have to conclude (among
many other things) that we have wasted a lot of time and energy on
nurturing and education of all types. Learning might be seriously
circumscribed. We rightly refuse to believe that we are all helpless in
the face of our genetic endowment. It turns out that some of our genes
lie in wait to be turned on or off (and to turn on or off other genes) at
some opportune time. This is the way selection operates in all living
beings. Matt Ridley reports an important discovery about how creatures
(including people) function. Whereas a small percentage of our genes
guarantee that the overwhelming majority of individuals are born with
all the right parts in the right places, they have other functions as well:
"The function of many genes is ... to help switch other genes on or off.
And the susceptibility of a gene to be switched on or off depends on the
sensitivity of its promoters," a species of genetic material that facilitates
the production of proteins when other genetic materials ("transcription
factors") attach themselves."' What causes such genes to switch other
genes on or off? Put simply, the answer is the environment, as defined
broadly in terms of the unique, non-genetic experiences each individual
encounters.
2. The Open-ended Process of Selection. Our legal system
presupposes that each of us possesses a brain button that turns on and
off behavior as if we were flipping a kitchen light switch.1 2 This
presupposition is non-controversially understood by neurologists,
cognitive psychologists, neuropsychologists, and others working within
the brain sciences as inaccurate. Our cortical controls simply do not
operate in a manner that resembles the Cartesian paradigm.113

110. See generally Thomas Bouchard et al., Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness:
Genetic and EnvironmentalInfluences and Personality Correlates,2 TwIN RES. 88 (1999).
111. RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NuRTuRE, supra note 82, at 32.
112. See supra Part I.A.

113. The MPC's division of mens rea into four categories, which the drafters concede
exist only on a continuum and cannot be rationally determinate without question-begging,
constitutes implicit but only partial recognition of the way in which our control functions
actually operate. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE §2.02 cmts.
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Although the world appears to us as a unified, bound picture, we now
know that, while we do possess some variably localized centers for most
of our perceptual processing, these perceptual processes are in fact
dispersed among a mind-boggling number of neurons and neuronal
groupings and connections. This intertwined city of neurons sometimes
develops in parallel and redundant loop-like patterns, and sometimes
they form along one-way paths as we experience our worlds-for good or
bad-by selecting what is needed for adaptation, which works on the
basis of "a preexisting capacity that an organism possesses from
birth."114
What the process of selection entails in all creatures great and small
is "the continual adaptive matching or fitting of elements in one physical
domain [generally the frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex for humans] to
novelty occurring in elements of another [the world around us]."115
Natural selection operates at the level of genomes-changing or mutating
our genetic alphabet-and it does so on the basis of "recognition" rather
than "information." The receptive resources produced by natural
selection stand ready to absorb information from the outside and respond
automatically. We are designed to be that way, and these processes are
always on duty, for better or worse.
One way to illustrate the distinction between recognition and other
forms of information exchange is by reference to a familiar physical
process, our immune system, which, like all of our systems, operates on
the basis of selection by recognition. When an infection or disease or any
form of invasive trauma occurs, a spectacular biochemical product of
natural selection works over time on our genome; the system operates
through decentralized resources that are recruited to attack the
invaders. The system immediately identifies products in the body that
are not us. The system's magic lies in its ability to recognize immediately invading objects that are foreign. When "non-self" invaders appear,
the system-wide biochemical process springs into action as lymphocytes
recognize and bind to the molecular non-selves, targeting them for
removal and destruction." 6 The majesty and mystery of the process
is that the encroaching outsiders do not pass information to the immune
system about their novel qualities. Rather, our immune system
recognizes the non-self pathogenic molecules without an obvious

114. GAZZANIGA, supra note 97, at 14. There is, in fact, some dispute about the extent
to which the environment may effect brain anatomy after birth.
115. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at 74.
116. For an explanation of the operation of lymphocytes, see BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL.,
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL (4th ed. 2002), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=mboc4.section.4422.
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information exchange from the invaders to the responders. In other
words, the immune system exists within us and arrives at problems
ready to recognize and react against foreign invaders.'1 7 This system
of selection is open-ended and pervasive; it operates within every sphere
of our lives.
Despite our persistent primitive intuitions, within this selection
system there is no single neurobiological control center."' It does not
work that way. Rather, our capacities are dispersed in a process of
diffusion that often distributes normally among millions of neuronal
groups that deliver the world to, and process it for, us. These groups
generate specific capacities that generally vary along familiar standard
distributions.119 This occurs because, like our immune system, to
survive we must continually select and develop based on our actual
experiences so that on any day in question our cognition, our perceptions,
and the processes we bring to our choices necessarily vary.12 0 To
choose anything or nothing is to make a choice in this system. Two
important points follow from this biological fact: First, our hard-wiring
(genotype) was formed at a time when simply surviving and passing on
one's genes to progeny were all that life required and probably as much
as anyone could perform. Second, and at the level of phenotype, each
individual makes the choices he then can effect, which depend in large
part on the actual circumstances and experiences he encounters.
The take-home point here is so closely aligned with our intuitions that
it should not need emphasis: The actual circumstancesof our lives affect

117. EDELMAN, BRIGHT Am, supra note 15, at 75-79 (noting that the immune system
is a "recognizing system [that] first generates a diverse population of antibody molecules
and then selects ex post facto those that fit or match. It does this continually and, for the
most part, adaptively."). Edelman won the 1972 Nobel Prize in medicine for this discovery.
The Nobel Prize in Physiologyor Medicine 1972, NOBEL PRIZE, http://nobelprize.org/nobelprizes/medicinellaureates/1972 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
118. As one researcher points out, even within a single system, such as the visual
system, dimensions like color, motion, location, and object identification are processed in
different areas of the brain. Adina L. Roskies, The Binding Problem, 24 NEURON 7, 7
(1999).
119. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN
THE MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 99 (1999); EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at 28-29;

SEARLE, MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY, supranote 22, at 90; Andrew E. Lelling, Comment,
Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscienceand the CriminalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1471,
1495 (1993). This is not to say that there is not also domain specificity; there is. It is to
say that along with specificity there is dispersal so that systems operate together to bring
about perception. See, e.g., Semir Zeki, The Visual Image in Mind and Brain, in THE
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN BOOK OF THE BRAIN 17, 17-28 (1999).
120. JOSEPH LEDOUx, SYNAPTIC SELF: HOW OUR BRAINS BECOME WHO WE ARE 74-79
(2002).
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both our morphology and individual development; these are indefeasible
facts of human existence. Comparing our brains to our immune system
"shows that genetic evolution does not invariably lead to the kind of
modularity that excludes open-ended processes. Instead, it can create
processes that are themselves evolutionary and therefore capable of
providing new solutions to new problems."121 Antonio Damasio states
the crucial point:
[Als we develop from infancy to adulthood, the design of brain
circuitries that represent our evolving body and its interaction with the
world seems to depend on the activities in which the organism engages,
and on the action of innate bioregulatory circuitries, as the latterreact
to such activities.122

3. The Way It Works: The Macro Level.'" To this point, we
have examined the jurisprudential model of human behavior, which
assumes that individuals at virtually all times have the capacity to
throw the "right" switch and effect the "right" decision. Descartes's
mind-body dualism still holds sway in much of our jurisprudence and its
processes. We next looked at the operation of natural selection, which
demonstrates that evolution has created a genomic structure that is open
and ready to respond to the world. This next part briefly reviews the
product of and the mechanisms that deliver the magic of recognition and
adaptation.
It is true that the neurons in our brains operate mechanistically.
Once an action potential is reached, the cell will fire, as is explained
below. That does not mean we are simple automatons, however. (There
may be enough play in the quantum nature of individual nerve cells to
account for the ability of most people, most of the time, to will actions.)" This next subsection looks briefly at the operation of the
nervous system, which permits us to interact with the world and learn

121. DAVID SLOAN WILSON, DARWIN'S CATHEDRAL: EVOLUTION, RELIGION, AND THE
NATURE OF SOCIETY 30-31 (2002).
122. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 15, at 111.
123. The information in this subsection comes primarily from the work of Susan
Greenfield, a distinguished neuropharmacologist at Oxford, and Robert Sapolsky, a
distinguished biologist and neurologist at Stanford. See, e.g., SUSAN GREENFIELD, THE
PRIVATE LIFE OF THE BRAIN: EMOTIONS, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE SECRET OF THE SELF
ch. 1 (2000); Sapoisky, supra note 2.
124. See, e.g., Friedrich Beck & John C. Eccles, QuantumAspects ofBrain Activity and
the Role of Consciousness, 89 PROC. NAVL ACAD. Scl. USA 11357 (1992); Jeffrey M.

Schwartz et al., Quantum Physics in Neuroscienceand Psychology: A NeurophysicalModel
of Mind-Brain Interaction, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTION ROYAL Soc'Y LONDON 1309 (2005),
availableat http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/360/14581309.full.
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from our experience, and examines the mechanisms for selection in the
monoamine oxidase (MAOA) case.
Our skulls are filled with billions of neurons that wait at rest (in
"resting potential") to be aroused, initially, by some signal(s) from the
environment. When alerted, a dendritic branch-the part of a nerve cell
that receives signals and initiates the brain's internal information
flow-now sufficiently aroused-sets off a chemical reaction (an "action
potential"). This reaction excites the resting neuron at its axon, a long
projection covered in myelin that, so excited, carries an electrical charge
to the neuron's "axon terminal," where connections are made to the next
neuron or neuronal group(s). Once a neuron is triggered at the "axon
hillock" the process of electrical transmission moves forward undiminished in strength until information is passed along to the next neuronal
connection at the axon terminal or post-synaptic terminal.
A Typical Neuronl25

Termiral buttont,_-

How neurons communicate with each other is also a vital part of this
story. For all the billions of neurons in our heads, there is a tiny
microscopic gap-a synapse-between each, and this gap must be
traversed chemically for information to be transmitted from one neuron
to the next. A variety of neurotransmitters accomplishes this feat of
synaptic transmission, "the basic building block of virtually all brain

125. This image is available at http//www.mindcreators.com/NeuronBasics.htm. This
image has been reprinted with permission.
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operations." 126
These neurotransmitters-chemicals packaged in
vesicles that either excite or inhibit the next neuron in the line-should
fit neatly into the corresponding receptors in the next neuron. If the
transmitters do not fit properly, there is likely to be a problem,
sometimes a serious behavioral problem;12 7 we ret
to this topic in
the next section.
The Brainl2
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GREENFIELD, supra note 123, at 7.

127. E.g., id. at ch. 4 (discussing the impact of drug use on neurotransmission); ROBERT
M. SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS DON'T GET ULCERs 278-84 (3d ed. 2004) (describing the

neurochemistry of depression).
128. The image above was produced by Stephanie Seneff and has been reprinted here
with permission. For more information, contact senefl~csail.mit.edu.
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These often microscopic neurons operate within the gross anatomy of
the brain. The brain is organized into at least three major systems.'"
One, the thalamocortical system, lies deep within the brain and is
connected to the cerebral cortex (or laminae, the multi-layered gray
matter that envelopes most of our brain anatomy) through bi-directional
input and output mechanisms. Thus, most of the neurons in this system
are connected reciprocally in that they signal in both directions (backand-forth) so that stimulus input is grasped, organized, and categorized.
In a healthy individual, these mechanisms commonly generate excitation
down thousands of connected neurons.
Among the critical performance centers within this system is the
prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the amygdala. The PFC houses our
executive functions.ao The PFC is also connected to centers of motor
control; more importantly, the PFC is linked with the oldest part of our
brain, the brain stem, which houses our "fight or flight" response to fear.
Properly functioning, the PFC acts to suppress the more atavistic
tendencies of the brain stem. The brain stem is the most fundamental
component of the brain, one that "deviates relatively little in a vast
range of species, from reptiles to humans."'
The PFC is thus implicated in behavior. In particular, the PFC "sends
large inhibitory projections into the limbic system, particularly the
amygdala, a region heavily implicated in aggressive behaviour." 32 A
core function of PFC activation is anticipation of reward via interactions
between the neurotransmitter dopamine and the PFC. These interactions can change in strength and can "take the form of an enhanced
capacity to sustain dopamine release as the interval between the onset
of a task and its reward increases. This would constitute the neural
basis of an increasing capacity for self-discipline and gratification
postponement."'as For example, the leading hypothesis today among
neuroscientists who study abnormal behavior "is that in psychopathic
criminals the [PFCI-amygdala connections are disrupted, leading to

129. GERALD M. EDELMAN & GIULIO TONONI, A UNIVERSE OF CONSCIOUSNESS:
MATER BECOMES IMAGINATION 42-47 (2000).

How

130. For a summary of this point, see Oliver Sacks, Inside the Executive Brain, N.Y.

REv. BOOKS, Apr. 26,2001, at 46 (reviewing ELKHONON GOLDBERG, THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN:
FRONTAL LOBES AND THE CIVILIZED MIND (2001), which noted that the frontal lobes are the

most recently evolved-and last to be celebrated as the most important-region of the human
brain).
131.

GREENFIELD, supra note 123, at 3.

132. Sapoisky, supra note 2, at 1791.
133. Id. at 1792.
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deficits in contextual fear conditioning, regret, guilt, and affect
regulation.""a
The second major neuroanatomical assembly operates unidirectionally;
the neurons transmit "information" or signals along axons-the neuron's
length-in only one direction. This assembly is composed of three
structures: the cerebellum (mostly concerned with coordination and
motor synchrony-capacities about which we do not want consistent
feedback), the basal ganglia (largely responsible for planning and
executing complex motor movements), and the hippocampus, which plays
a crucial role in short and long-term memory functions and how they are
stored (a system over which we wish we had some control).135
The third major system consists of a diffuse set of connections
concentrated in the brainstem and hypothalamus. A key structure in
directing the relationships among the many systems is the amygdala, a
major player which, not surprisingly, participates in our emotional life
and is constituted by a set of neurons that lie at the "neuronal crossroads, perfectly positioned for the meeting of previously unassociated
inputs converging from different brain regions."n36 As noted, the
amygdala, along with the PFC, also plays a prominent role in our
3
responses to fear-inducing situations."
Among other things, the
hypothalamic/brain stem region releases hormones (blood-born neurotransmitters) and other neuromodulators, chemicals that influence
neural activity, including value systems, and ultimately human
behavior.3 s
"Value systems" are essential to our brain's efforts to maintain
reasonable homeostasis. They are in some ways the key to natural
selection. These systems include the "phenotypic aspects of an organism
that were selected during evolution and constrain somatic selective
events, such as the synaptic changes that occur during brain development and experience."'
A value system is thus composed of those
observable characteristics of our species that, in operation, define and
constrain our developmental functioning. For example, think about the
shape of our hands and our prehensile thumb, or the nature of our
perceptual apparatuses, among many others: respectively, they provide

134. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility,and the Brain,5 PLoS BIOLOGY 693,69495 (2007) (footnotes omitted), availableat http-//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=982487.
135. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 123, at 19, 67.
136. Id. at 20.
137. See generally JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS
UNDERPINNINGS OF EMOTIONAL LIFE (1996); Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1791.
138. See, e.g., EDELMAN & TONONI, supra note 129, at 42-47.
139. Id. at 88.
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a framework for tactile and visual possibilities. In a word, value
systems make possible our ability to orchestrate our "perceptual [and]
behavioral reponse [s]."n1o Such systems are necessary preconditions
to organizing our universes, but they are not sufficient alone to permit
understanding."1 Learning and adaptation occurs when perceptual
categories and memory are linked to hedonic centers, which attach value
to the categories. These centers include the usual: sexual, other
appetitive functions, and our maintenance systems generally."
Learning, for good or ill, seems to occur when global maps and value
centers within the brain are linked neurally." Learning "connect[s]
categorization to behaviors having adaptive value under conditions of
expectancy," when expectancy refers to places ("set points") within those
neurobiological structures that make up parts of our hedonic systems
that are not yet satisfied.'" "Learning is achieved when behavior
leads to synaptic changes in global mappings that satisfy the set
points.""' Memory, whether explicit or implicit, involves being able
Moreover,
to repeat a performance, and it is key to learning."
memory is a system property that occupies different populations of
neuronal groups within the brain. Unlike computers, we do not store
bits of coded information awaiting the appropriate input to be spat out
on command. Rather, memory operates dynamically to enhance an
ability to categorize events in different locations within the brain."'

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at 100.
143. "Mapping" is the process whereby information from receptors on the body (touch
or vision) finds a point on the cortical sheets that compose the brain. These maps permit
the brain to respond to a three-dimensional world "with spatial signals about pressure or
wavelength differences" in the four-dimensional world we live in (where time is the fourth
dimension). Id. at 19.
144. Id. at 101.
145. Id.
146. Explicit or "declarative" memory is the stuff of concentration, that is, it occurs
when "we are aware we are remembering something in the first place." GREENFIELD, supra
note 123, at 67. Central here is the hippocampus. Implicit or "procedural" memory
describes the effortless execution of tasks that comes from repeated practice, whereby
learned sequences are organized into an "autopilot" effect. Id. at 66-67; accord Cacioppo
et al., supra note 1, at 654; Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1790.
147. If you doubt this, simply recall the last time you were unable to remember a
specific event, name, or label. Suppose it is a place you have visited. You can picture the
place in your mind; perhaps you can remember the people you were with at the place; you
might remember where you had lunch that day and some of the other things you did,
maybe what you wore, why you were there, and so on. Note what we do in these
circumstances: we rummage around our brains recalling a great deal about the scene and,
from everything we know about memory, we are recruiting and culling data that is stored
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This occurs by continual "recategorization," that is, repeated rehearsals
of similar information in different contexts. As Edelman and Tononi
point out, "There is no prior set of determinant codes governing the
categories of memory, only the previous population structure of the
network, the state of the value systems, and the physical acts carried out
at a given moment."' 8 Put otherwise, there are no memory algorithms. Memories arise because "of accumulations of synaptic changes
in the cortex as a result of multiple reinstatements of the memory,""
but synaptic changes alone are not sufficient either. Rather, memory is
a process that requires the use of a number of circuits that produce a
similar result. For that reason, memory "does not replicate an original
experience."so
The importance of this fact is that our brains-and the "minds" that
our brains constitute-can be changed, literally and (to some extent) at
all times. Ordinary aging aside, our brains and minds can and do
change in several different ways. One is through learning, a process
dependent upon the environment in which one lives and the conditions
to which one must adapt, again, for good or for ill. Closely related are
environmental effects on our ability to control the process of neurotransmission, which can be implicated in crime.
4. The Way It Works: The Micro Level. That the environment
affects human behavior, a point wholly consistent with our common
observations, is a well-established neuropsychological verity. A pertinent
example of this phenomenon was teased out of a multitude of data by a
team of neuroscientists led by Avshalom Caspi and Terri Moffitt. Caspi
and Moffitt tested "the hypothesis that childhood maltreatment
predisposes most strongly to adult violence among children whose
[monoamine oxidasel is insufficient to constrain maltreatment-induced
changes to neurotransmitter systems."5 1 Monoamine oxidase (MAOA),
in different places. Memory is the act of pulling those pieces together to access a single
name. People with Alzheimers, for example, have a harder time pulling those bits of
information out of their brains than the rest of us because some of their brain functions
have degenerated. See SAPOLSKY, WHY ZEBRAS, supra note 127, at 208-10.
148. EDELMAN & TONONI, supra note 129, at 98.
149. LEDOUx, SYNAPTIC SELF, supra note 120, at 107.
150. GERALD M. EDELMAN, WIDER THAN THE SKY: THE PHENOMENAL GIrr op
CONSCIOUSNESS 52 (2004).

151. Avshalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated
Children, 297 SCIENCE 851, 851 (2002). The research results have been replicated many
times. See, e.g., Richard L. Sjoberg et al., A Non-additive Interaction of a Functional
MAO-A VNTR and Testosterone PredictsAntisocialBehavior, 33 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 425, 430 (2008), available at httpJv/www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmdtarticles/PMC2665792
(finding that "functional MAOA alleles and testosterone interact to predict antisocial
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refers to brain enzymes that come in one of two forms, A or B. They are
responsible, with other neurochemicals, for the necessary degradation of
neurotransmitters after neurons have fired, thereby stopping the
previous signal to permit a new signal to get through to the next

neuron.
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antisocial and aggressive behavior). The particular phenomenon may, however, be limited
to white males. Richard L. Sjoberg et al., Adolescent Girls and CriminalActivity: Role of
MAOA-LPR Genotype and Psychosocial Factors, 144 AM. J. MED. GENET. PART B:
NEUROPSYCHIATRIc GENETICS 159 (2007); Widom & Brzustowicz, supra, at 688.
152. See Sjoberg, A Non-additive Interaction, supra note 151, at 429 ("The MAOA
enzyme metabolizes dopamine and other monoamine neurotransmitters such as serotonin
that are critical in emotional responses and behavioral inhibition."). For a definition of
MAOA, see http*/www.answers.com/ltopichnonoamine-oxidase.
153. The image is from http://click4biology.infotc4W6/hum6.5.htm. The image has been
reprinted with permission.
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Studying more than a thousand white children, over half of whom
were boys at various cohorts and longitudinality, the Caspi-Moffitt team
discovered that boys who suffered deficits in a key neurochemical and
who grew up in an abusive environment were substantially more likely
to engage in violent, anti-social behavior that led to unwelcome
interactions with the criminal justice system than were boys raised
either with the deficit but in a reasonably healthy environment or who
were raised in a healthy environment without the MAOA deficit. The
data demonstrated that children raised in abusive environments differ
significantly in the likelihood that they will engage in violent behavior,
"depending upon whether or not their genotype conferred high or low
Interestingly, the deficit in type A
levels of MAOA expression.""
monoamine-oxidase does not alone conduce to later violence; it is the
combination of a neurochemical anomaly plus abuse in the young child's
environment that produces unwanted developmental patterns. 5 5
In subsequent work, the original researchers confirmed their earlier
findings,156 expanded upon them, and advanced the basic notion that
it is the environment that tends to produce the (mal)adaptation in light
of individual differences and not a genetic deficit alone that causes the
poor behavior. This is consistent with, and is in fact an example of, the
primary realization that selection is an open-ended phenomenon:
Heterogeneity of response characterizes all known environmental risk
factors for psychopathology, including even the most overwhelming of
traumas. Such response heterogeneity is associated with pre-existing
individual differences in temperament, personality, cognition and
autonomic physiology, all of which are known to be under genetic
influence. The hypothesis of genetic moderation implies that differences between individuals, originating in the DNA sequence, bring about
differences between individuals in their resilience or vulnerability to
the environmental causes of many pathological conditions of the mind
and body."s'

154. Gene-Environment Interactionsand the Brain, BRAIN ETHICS (July 25, 2006),
http://brainethics.wordpress.com/200607/25/gene-environment-interactions-and-the-brain.
155. See Christopher J. Ferguson, Genetic Contributionsto Antisocial Personalityand
Behavior:A Meta-Analytic Review from an EvolutionaryPerspective, 150 J. Soc. PSYCHOL.
160,162(2010), availableat http//www.tamiu.edu/-CFERGUSON/evmeta.pdf(noting that
single gene polymorphism does not, alone, conduce to antisocial personality and behavior,
but rather, the genes interact with each other and combine environmental risk factors-such
as family violence-to produce unwelcome aggressive behavior).
156. See supra note 151.
157. Avshalom Caspi & Terrie E. Moffitt, Gene-EnvironmentInteractionsin Psychiatry:
JoiningForces with Neuroscience, 7 NATuRE REVIEwS NEuRosci. 583, 584 (2006) (footnote
omitted).
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Although much research is yet to be done before these interactions are
fully understood and some kind of fix may come along, Caspi and
Moffitt's research clearly indicates that "the gene-environment interaction approach assumes [and strongly suggests] that environmental
pathogens cause disorder.""s'
The more general take-home point here is made by Allan Gibbard:
"The genetic plan for a human being will be full of contingency plans:
full of schemes that in effect say 'If A then do X, whereas if B then do
Y.)"l59

Given a difference in how two people act, it is perfectly biological to say
something like this: the two people's genetic plans [their genotypes] are
the same in relevant respects. They've encountered, though, different
cues as to their circumstances. The cues the two have encountered
differ in ways for which the single genetic plan they share makes
provision. The plan they share is to respond one way given the one set
of cues and another way given the other. The cues in question may be
immediate ones, or they may be cues that came years ago in childhood
and have affected the development of psychic mechanisms or the
setting of parameters for them.'so
There is rich data in the neuroscience literature indicating that early
maternal rejection, physical or psychological abuse, and exposure to
environmental toxins conduce to violent behavior as the child ma-

tures.161

Raise a child in an abusive environment and the child, through no
fault of his or her own, is likely to suffer an important neurobiological
deficit or insult, and the likelihood is understandably increased that the
child will become a violent adult.'6 2 We have known all along, however, that such assaults affect development negatively, just as we have
known that the absence of touch and warmth in the early stages of
development conduces to more violence.' 63 Child abuse affects the
158. Id. at 583.
159. Allan Gibbard, Genetic Plans, Genetic Differences, and Violence: Some Chief
Possibilities,in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 75, at 169, 173.
160. Id. at 174.
161. See, e.g., Gary W. Evans & Elyse Kantrowitz, Socioeconomic Status and Health:
The PotentialRole ofEnvironmentalRisk Exposure, 23 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 303 (2002);
Dan Orzech, Chemical Kids-Environmental Toxins and Child Development, 7 Soc. WORK
TODAY 37 (MarJApr. 2007).
162. See Martin H. Teicher, Scars That Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child Abuse,
286 Sci. AM. 68 (2002).
163. Tiffany Field, Violence and Touch Deprivationin Adolescents,37 ADOLESCENCE 735
(2002); see also Jennifer E. Lansford et al., A 12-Year Prospective Study of the Long-Term
Effects of Early Child PhysicalMaltreatmenton Psychological,Behavioral,and Academic
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concentrations of certain cerebrospinal fluids," and exposure to
environmental toxins of all sorts can produce deviant behavior."'
Nevertheless, we generally refuse to adjust our legal environment to
these facts.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW OF NEUROSCIENTIFIC
DATA

People who commit crimes and endanger the well-being of others must
be treated, confined, or both. No responsible observer believes otherwise.
The neuroscientist Robert Sapolsky, who documents the fact that some
individuals with PFC deficits know the difference between right and
wrong but are nonetheless "organically incapable of appropriately
regulating their behaviour,"166 understands the illogic of blaming those
who suffer neurobiological deficits. He also recognizes that this view
"does not eliminate the need for forceful intervention in the face of
violence or antisocial behaviour."" Laurence R. Tancredi and Jonathan D. Brodie note that fMRI data may be very useful in setting group
norms in the context of brain research, but the data is not yet useful for
Joshua Greene and
exonerating individuals in the courtroom."
Jonathan Cohen, self-described hard determinists, suggest that, in time,
we may need to jettison entirely our traditional understanding of free
will, but they also state that the law will always have practical reasons
for punishing some individuals. They do predict, however, that in the
future "the idea of distinguishing the truly, deeply guilty from those who

Problemsin Adolescence, 156 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 824, 824(2002),
(examining a
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pm/articles/PMC2756659
community rather than an adjudicated sample and finding that "[elarly physical
maltreatment predicts adolescent psychological and behavioral problems, beyond the effects
of other factors associated with maltreatment").
164. Randall A. Ruppel et al., Excitatory Amino Acid Concentrationsin Ventricular
CerebrospinalFluidAfter Severe TraumaticBrainInjury in Infantsand Children:The Role
of Child Abuse, 138 J. PEDIATRICS 18 (2001); Cathy S. Widom, The Cycle of Violence, 244
SCIENCE 160, 163 (1989) (finding that children who suffered "physical abuse [alone] had the
highest level of arrests for violent criminal behavior, followed by victims of neglect").
165. Eric Taylor, The Roots and Role of Violence in Development, in VIOLENCE IN
SOCIETY 37, 49-52 (Pamela J. Taylor ed., 1993). See generally Mike May, Disturbing
Behavior:Neurotoxic Effects in Children, 108 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. A262 (2000), available
at http://www.mindfully.org/Health/Children-Neurotoxic-Effects.htm (discussing research
associating exposure to lead toxins with aggression and antisocial behavior in children).
166. Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1787.
167. Id. at 1794.
168. Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brainand Behavior:Limitations
in the Legal Use ofFunctional MagneticResonance Imaging, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 271, 29091 (2007).
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seem pointare merely victims of neuronal circumstances will .
less."169
The data from the brain sciences favoring some changes in our
jurisprudence is compelling: Our environments can trigger phenotypic
change and neuronal growth or death in a process of constant selforigination. As noted above, there was for generations neuroscientific
orthodoxy declaring that adult animals of almost every sort lacked the
capacity to generate new cortical neurons. That position has given way
to increasingly sophisticated research showing that all primates,
including human beings, have the capacity for generating new neurons
well after childhood development has ended. 7 o It is now clear from
research on subjects as apparently dissimilar as brainless worms and
baby mice to human beings that all God's creatures are capable of
learning. Such learning is accompanied by changes in the neurobiology
of all animals."
These conclusions butt hard into our commitment to the easy
formalism that pulls us in the direction of the comfortably familiar
dualism of the past and all that its collective wisdom generally entails.
What is less clear is why our law is generally unwilling to concede the
fact that individuals vary in their cognitive and volitional capacities for
control based on impoverished G x E (genes and environment) interactions, and that how we treat these individuals, given documentable
deficiencies, should vary from person to person. One universal
characteristic among all creatures is that the laws of nature constrain
what is possible for any given individual at any point in time. Criminality, and especially those forms of crime that are reflected in angry,
emotionally-charged, and unintelligible misconduct, is in substantial
measure a product of adaptation under circumstances over which the
actor often has, at least initially and crucially, no control. As a result,
not all actors have the capacity-in-fact to restrain either the occurrent
desire to act out their angry feelings or the rise of those feelings in the
first place. This is not to deny that such angry actors lack the capacity
for intentional conduct; they too possess frontal lobes and a capacity for
executive functioning.'7 2 It does deny that every non-psychopathologi-

169. Greene & Cohen, supra note 7, at 1781.
170. RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note 82, at 145-46.
171. Id. at 146-49.
172. See generally GOLDBERG, THE WISDOM PARADOX, supra note 101. There is data
supporting the notion that psychopaths, in particular, have well-functioning logical
processes; they simply cannot help themselves absent a gun to the head. See, e.g., Peter
Johansson & Margaret Kerr, Psychopathy and Intelligence: A Second Look, 19 J.
PERSONALITY DISORDERS 357 (2005) (finding no difference in general intelligence between
psychopaths and nonpsychopaths); Mobbs et al., supra note 134, at 694-95 (footnotes
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cal actor who commits harmful acts in fact possesses adequate capacity
to meet the social norms of control. 173 The ability to control also exists
on a continuum, and those individuals on the left tail of that continuum
may possess inadequate mechanisms for control yet not meet the extant
standards for insanity or lack of competency. Such wrongdoers usually
require incapacitation and always require rehabilitation, but they do not
necessarily deserve punishment and blame in the hell-holes that
constitute our prison system.
Our folk psychology is generally a wonderful resource for the
successful use of practical reasoning.174 We could not exist without it.
Folk psychology tells us when to be cautious even before we fully
perceive a threat;' 7 1 it ordinarily permits us to make wise decisions
about the people with whom we must and choose to associate; it usually
permits us to decide how to allocate our time and prioritize events; and
so on. There are strong emotional modules at work that inform our
ability to engage in practical reasoning."' Despite our undoubted
commitment to seeking a more comprehensive understanding of the
human condition, we sometimes permit predispositions to withhold the
approval of new learning because some truths are hard to accept; they
often appear threatening. For that reason, we are usually right to be
skeptical of challenges to our received folk psychological wisdom-skeptical both theoretically and epistemologically, when the former
calls into question the implications of major changes for social order and
the latter calls into question on various grounds the soundness or bases
of some new scheme of beliefs or system of thought. When the data

omitted) (noting that a central thesis "is that in psychopathic criminals the prefrontalamygdala connections are disrupted, leading to deficits in contextual fear conditioning,
regret, guilt, and affect regulation").
173. See, e.g., Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1787 (arguing that PFC damage can produce
individuals who know the difference between right and wrong and are, nonetheless,

'organically incapable of appropriately regulating their behaviour").
174. Here, I am using the phrase "folk psychology" to describe a theory of human
psychology which is represented in the mind-brain and which underpins our everyday
capacity to predict and explain the behavior of ourselves and others. On this view, folk
psychology is a data structure or knowledge representation which mediates between our
observations of behavior-in-circumstances and our predictions and explanations of that
behavior. Ian Raverscroft, Folk Psychology asa Theory, STAN. ENCYC. PHIL. (Winter 2005),
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/win2005/entries/folkpsych-theory (emphasis omitted).
175. See, e.g., DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR, supra note 15, at 166-76 (discussing the
somatic marker thesis).
176. Practical reasoning processes means simply the individual's reasons to act or not
to act on idea X. See ROBERT AUDI, THE ARCHITECTURE OF REASON: THE STRUCTURE AND
SUBSTANCE OF RATIONALITY 4 (2001).
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demand a change, however, they should be heeded: "Socialpolicy must
adapt to a world in which everybody is different.""'
What follows is an outline of the potential for neuroscience in criminal
law, beginning with what it cannot now do, at least at this point in time,
and then moving on to what it can do. The techniques of cognitive
neuroscience and brain imaging cannot tell any fact-finder what was
going on in the mind of the defendant at the time he committed a crime.
Nor can we yet determine whether an individual-a witness, for
example-is telling the truth, overstated claims to the contrary notwithstanding."' These techniques, however, certainly can tell when our
norms should be adjusted to account for the background of the individuals whose conduct we rightly sanction.
A. What Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics Cannot Now Do and
What It Can Do
A somewhat surprising and refreshing consensus is emerging in the
neurosciences. The agreement is reflected in this Symposium in its
participants appropriately modest outlook on neuroscience's current
impact concerning what this emerging field tells us about the less
Most seem
observable, neurobiological facets of an individual life.'"
to agree with the late Richard Feynman's understanding of success in
science, which emphasizes how long and hard one needs to work to gain
even a tiny purchase on the workings of the universe.8 o After describing the current limitations, I will suggest that neuroscience has a great
deal to tell us now about some of the norms of our criminal justice.

177. RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra note 82, at 269.
178. See, e.g., Alexis Madrigal, MRI Lie Detection to Get FirstDay in Court, WIRED SCl.
(Mar. 16, 2009, 5:41 PM), http-//www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/03/noliemri.
179. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Avoiding IrrationalNeurolaw Exuberance:A Plea for
Neuromodesty, 62 MERCER L. REV. 837 (2011); Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain
Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REv. 861 (2011).
180. "I have . .. found out how hard it is to get to really know something, how careful
you have to be about checking your experiments, how easy it is to make mistakes," and
comparing that process to the truth-claiming statements made by some social scientists
who "haven't done the work." Richard Feynman on "Social Sciences," MAYOMO (Dec. 16,
2009), http://mayomo.net/68362-richard-feynman-on-social-sciences.
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1. Limitations Based on Imaging.1 6' Neuroimaging permits
insight in real time into the "neural structures and processes in normal
and disordered thought.""' How does it work? Take functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for example, which provides realtime insights into the areas of the brain that are especially active in
response to certain tasks:
The current model of the hemodynamic response . . . posits that a

transient increase in neuronal activity within a region of the brain
begins consuming additional oxygen in the blood proximal to these cells
but also causes local vasodilation. As a result, blood near a region of
local neuronal activity soon has a higher concentration of oxygenated
hemoglobin than blood in locally inactive areas. The blood oxygen level
dependent (BOLD) fMRI provides a measure of these hemodynamic
adjustments and-by inference-the transient changes in neuronal
activity in the proximal brain tissue."as
To (over)simplify, fMRI uses huge magnets (calibrated in "teslas") to
measure changes in oxygen level as blood flows into areas of the brain
that are activated by some stimulus." The evidence strongly supports
the idea that brain processing demands elevated levels of oxygen in the
areas of the brain where the processing occurs. Thus, as oxygen to any
given area of the brain increases, the inference of relatively site specific
The changes are then mapped in beautiful
activity increases.'s

181. On the current capabilities of fMRI imaging, see Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Serendipitous Timing: The Coincidental Emergence of the New Brain Science and the
Advent of an Epistemological Approach to Determining the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony, 62 MERCER L. REV. 959 (2011), and Charles Adelsheim, FunctionalMagnetic
Resonance Detection of Deception: Great as Fundamental Research, Inadequate as
Substantive Evidence, 62 MERCER L. REv. 885 (2011).
182. Cacioppo et al., supra note 1, at 651.
183. Id.
184. Xuchu Weng et al., Imaging the FunctioningHuman Brain,96 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
ScI. USA 11073, 11073 (1999), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/96/20/11073/.full.
pdf+html.
185. See generally Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the
Admissibility andPersuasivenessof fMRI, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN, supra note 65, at 23.

The underlying theory of fMRI is that when neurons are active, they demand energy, which
is supplied by a high energy molecule called adenosine triphosphate (ATP), which in turn
is produced by oxygen and glucose in the blood. Because more oxygen is supplied to the
active brain region than is consumed, the ratio of oxygenated to deoxygenated blood in the
active region increases. This results in changes in magnetic resonance (MR) signal
intensity, as measured by an MR scanner, because oxygenated and deoxygenated blood
have different magnetic susceptibilities. The best fMRI technology today can focus on an
area of the brain no larger than a grain of rice.
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(perhaps too beautiful) colors projected on a computer monitor. What
gets mapped, though, is not the brain activity itself; we cannot do that.
Rather, what is displayed is an artifact of brain activity plotted by
algorithms to correspond to a known area of the brain. The displayed
brain image can vary greatly "depending on the signal threshold, color,
contrast, or ordinates the technician chooses or even the brand of
machine available in a particular laboratory."" Moreover, images are
always compared to "average" or "normal" brains and therein lie several
potential difficulties: the image of any individual's brain has to be
compared to some baseline to determine if it is normal, but what is
normal is neither always clear nor shared from one lab or researcher to
another. 187
As if problems related to machine intensity and determining the
norms of an average brain were not sufficient to cast doubt on the
admissibility of fMRI displays in a single criminal case, preliminary
issues related to logical relevance are also daunting. Efforts to introduce
imaging evidence in the guilt phase of trial have been made in numerous
cases in which claims of mental incompetence,'8 insanity,s9 and
inability to deceive were presented. 90 Among the reasons this type of
evidence is either inadmissible or not convincing is the chain of
inferences that must be drawn out to support the relevance of the
images.
What stands in the way? Evidence presented at trial is prima facie
admissible if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that
is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence."' 9' The trial court
judge makes a preliminary determination of both relevance and whether
the evidence submitted meets acceptable standards for scientific

186. Donald Reeves et al., Limitations of Brain Imaging in Forensic Psychiatry, 31 J.
AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 89, 90 (2003).
187. Id. at 90.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 719 (M.D. Pa. 2005)
(admitting scans from multiple imaging sources and finding credible evidence that the
defendant suffered significant abuse and borderline personality disorder but finding not
credible, among other things, the "conclusion that [the defendant] was not competent and
not acting voluntarily, intelligently and rationally at the time of... the change of plea").
189. People v. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 717-18, 724 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (admitting
evidence of brain cyst to buttress claim of insanity in a murder case).
190. United States v. Mezvinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (refusing
to admit PET scans to buttress claim of lack of mens rea). See generally 0. Carter Snead,
Neuroimagingand the "Complexity"of CapitalPunishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 129294 (2007) (surveying the admissibility of imaging evidence in a number of contexts).
191. FED. R. EVID. 401.
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evidence.19 2 Following the Supreme Court of the United States 1993
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,19s the
Federal Rules of Evidence were amended to state that expert evidence
is admissible "if (1) the [expert] testimony is based upon sufficient facts
or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case."194 Daubert requires trial courts to
test the reliability of proffered scientific evidence.1es The inquiry
comes in multiple parts: (1) whether the theory or technique on which
the testimony rests can be or has been tested; (2) "whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication"; (3)
whether the known or potential error rate of the theory or technique
when applied is acceptable; and (4) whether the theory or technique has
been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.'
Now plug in fMRI, which is "a technique [used] to image brain activity
related to a specific task or sensory process."' 97 To satisfy the standards of admissibility in a case in which the defendant, for example,
seeks to introduce fMRI evidence to support a claim of inability to form
the requisite mens rea, the court would have to find credible the chain
of inferences running from the fMRI data to the psychological function
or construct of interest. The chain of inferences runs like this:
fMRI data

-4

BOLD data -+ neuronal activity -4 psychological

function'98
In other words, the court must begin with the assumption that a given
area of the brain-area Q-is more likely to be activated in a wellfunctioning brain than in the defendant's. That is to say, the first
inference one must demonstrate runs from the fMRI data (the beautiful
colors of the brain area that are highlighted on the computer screen) to
the data indicating that area Q was activated. The BOLD signals in the
regions of interest in the brain of the subject in whatever task the
subject was asked to do while the imaging took place. Next, the
proponent has to show the reliability of the second inference, which

192. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (stating that "[p]reliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness ... or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court").
193. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
194. FED. R. EVID. 702 (amended 2000).
195. 509 U.S. at 589.
196. Id. at 593-94.
197. Program for Imaging & Cognitive Scis., The Future Role of FunctionalMRI in
Medical Applications,COLUMBIA UNIV., http//www.fmri.org/fmri.htm (last visited Mar. 11,
2011).
198. See Feigenson,supra note 185, at 32.
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tracks the relationship between the BOLD signals to the neuronal
activity in regions of interest in the brain of the subject in that task
condition. The BOLD signal is lighting up area Q of the brain. The
third inference moves from the neuronal activity recorded in area Q to
the neuropsychological function that the proponent of the evidence is
interested in. For example, area Q is associated with the deficient
mental activity; further, deficit affected the ability to form the requisite
culpability state at t, the moment the crime occurred.
Again, each one of these inferences has to satisfy the screen of
reliability under the appropriate scientific evidence standard and, in the
case of inference (3)-from neuronal activity to neuropsychological
function-the proponent has to satisfy the basic standard of the relevance
of fMRI evidence for law, both of which are crucial considerations.
Inference (1)-from the fMRI data to the BOLD data in the regions of
interest in the brain of the subject in the task or experimental condition-is affected by the researchers' decisions regarding, and the
assumptions underlying, the data processing methods used, most of
which have not yet converged on the kind of consensus that would allow
the basic technology to automatically remove doubts about reliability (as
have x-rays, for instance). Inference (2)-from the BOLD data to
neuronal activity-is less problematic, but it is still potentially troublesome. Although the vast majority of brain researchers believe that local
blood flow in the brain is related to neural activity, the precise
relationship is not yet completely understood. Inference (3)-from
neuronal activity to psychological function-raises fundamental questions
about the theories and concepts relied upon in the design of fMRI studies
and the associations drawn between fMRI data and the cognitive or
emotional function of interest. 199
All but a few of even its strongest proponents understand that imaging
is not mind reading. Imaging can provide only post hoc explanations
and thus is only one among many windows into the brain; all imaging
That this is so follows from the chain of
requires interpretation."
inferences that must be drawn and the assumptions that must be made
to move from an imaging artifact to satisfying the dictates of logical
relevance at trial. (And in contrast to issues of mental fitness that arise
in a criminal case, in civil cases, in which the issue is often one of
physical injury, the admissibility of imaging evidence along with clinical

199. Id. Feigenson demonstrates the potential problems that arise each step of the
way.
200. Mobbs et al., supra note 134, at 698.
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assessments presents far fewer problems.)201 This is not to say that
neuroimaging has no current relevance in our criminal justice system,
a point taken up shortly. It is to say that its use in the guilt phase of
criminal proceedings is quite limited.202 As explained later, the data
should be useful for changing our punishment regime.
Limitations on the Use of Behavioral Genetics
Behavioral geneticists study "genetic and environmental factors that
create behavioral differences among individuals."20 3 Adding to the
complexity that is necessary to understand both its limitations and
potential, human behavioral genetics looks at "estimation[s] of variance
components-that is, why people's behavior. . . differs from one person
to another."2 04 There are two central ideas here: "heritability," which
refers to the capacity of our genomes within a sample to pass a trait on
to our progeny, and "variation," which speaks to the contents and
measures that compose the significant extent to which that capacity is
influenced by random events.2 05 Although a tendency to criminality
is heritable,206 there is no reason to believe that all of the children of
B.

201. See, e.g., Matuszak v. Cerniak, 805 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. 3d 2004) (admitting
imaging data to show neurological injury but finding insufficient evidence of causal link
between hypoxic episode suffered during colonoscopy and injury); Fini v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
No. 227592, 2003 WL 1861025, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting SPECT images to prove head injuries
following an automobile accident).
202. There is a related concern: Even if imaging technology can meet all the hurdles
on the road to admissibility, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 places discretion in the hands
of the trial court judge to exclude otherwise admissible evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. Virtually everyone who has
worked with imaging displays has noted a phenomenon that some refer to informally as
the "Christmas tree phenomenon:" the tendency of observers, including jurors and judges,
to be overwhelmed by the pictures of the brain. Mobbs et al., supra note 134, at 699
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Martha J. Farah,Emerging EthicalIssues in
Neuroscience, 5 NATURE NEUROSCI. 1123, 1127 (2002).
203. ROBERT PLOMIN, NATURE AND NURTURE: AN INTRODUCTION To HUMAN BEHAVIORAL
GENETICS 4 (1990).

204. David C. Rowe & Kristen C. Jacobsen, In the Mainstream:Research in Behavioral
Genetics, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND BIOLOGY 12, 16 (Ronald

A. Carson & Mark A. Rothstein eds., 1999).
205. See, e.g., EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, supra note 15, at chs. 5-6; STEPHEN J. GOULD,
THE FLAMINGO'S SMILE: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 326 (1985); RIDLEY, NATURE
VIA NURTURE, supra note 82, at 76-77.

206. Adopted children, for example, tend to end their lives with criminal records that
far more strongly resemble their biological parents' records than those of their adoptive
parents. See, e.g., PLOMIN, supranote 203, at 108-10; RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE, supra
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criminal parents are destined to become criminals themselves. 207 Nor
is there reason to believe that researchers will one day find a criminality
gene. There is no known gene or cluster of genes that controls one's
propensity for criminal conduct. It is likely that if scientists found
something like a gene that conduces to criminality they would discover
that the same genetic complex is necessary for the pursuit of useful
endeavors. 2 08 This is so because "genes do not act in a solitary manner-they act in concert with other genes, often with many genes."0 s
Given the interdependency of genetic and structural components of
human behavior, there is reason to question the likelihood that
researchers will find a direct causal link between specific genetic alleles
and crimes, even though most practitioners and commentators allow that
genes affect even voluntary behavior.210 Professor Owen Jones makes
three important points in this context. First, criminal behavior, like all
of our behavior, "is influenced by both environmental and genetic forces,
as well as by their interaction."2 11 Second, genetic influences do not
equate with genetic explanation: what behavioral genetics can do is
provide some insight into why certain behaviors are more likely in one
population than another. Finally, he notes that "[tlo say a behavior is
natural, biological, or genetically influenced is never to say it is for that
reason good or excusable, or automatically entitled to any legal deference
or relevance whatsoever."2 12 Certain individual assessments cannot be
turned over to neuroscience in bulk because they require human
judgment about the definitions of our norms and their application in
particular cases. It is in this realm, however, that neuroscience has
much to tell us; it can support or debunk our existing norms.

note 82, at 87.
207. PLOMIN, supra note 203, at 108.
208. There is at least one school of thought that suggests that even if this is correct,
it "is unlikely to generate practical strategies" because (a) some of the responsible genes
may be relevant to useful, productive behavior; (b) levels of testosterone that conduce to
aggressive behavior affect numerous brain sites and therefore cannot be controlled
sufficiently to prove useful in controlling aggression; and (c) any useful diagnostic
procedures would be highly intrusive and over-inclusive. See Tabitha M. Powledge,
Genetics and the Control of Crime, 46 BIOScIENCE 7, 7 (1996).
Worms, Flies, and
209. Kenneth F. Schaffner, Genetic Explanations of Behauior: 'Of
Men, in GENETICS AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 75, at 79, 83. But see Jones, supra
note 3, at 87 ("There is no gene or set of genes (or allele or set of alleles) that are for-or
directly responsible for-criminal behavior.").
210. Wasserman & Wachbroit, supra note 75, at 12-13.
211. Jones, supra note 3, at 87.
212. Id.
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C. The Promise of the New Brain Sciences
Neither neuroimaging nor behavioral genetics can tell us what went
on in the mind of a killer when he killed or what his motives were.
Neuroimaging fails because we commit a categorical error if we assume
"that the organization of cognitive phenomena maps in a 1:1 fashion into
the organization of the underlying neural substrates.... [Miost complex
psychological or behavioral concepts do not map into a single center in
the brain."21 3 Behavioral genetics also fails at the level of predicting
individual behavior. Put simply, the basic tools of the trade address
issues in terms of population characteristics rather than individual
traits. As researchers point out, studies in behavioral genetics are
helpful "in quantifying the magnitude of genetic and environmental
influences, albeit in a broad, statistical manner through abstract
variance components."214 In other words, the discipline (and its cousin,
behavioral ecology) produces statistical and "probabilistic information,"215 the very stuff of which behavioral norms are created.
Although the neurosciences are relatively indeterminate with respect
to the causal relationship between a structural, genetic, or functional
deficiency and specific criminal conduct on a specific occasion, the data
sets have generated rich mines that address our behavioral norms. We
can now meaningfully ask whether individuals who suffer psychopathy
or reduced prefrontal cortex mass, or who grow up in abusive households
and also suffer neurotransmitter deficits, are entitled to a tailored,
compassionate social response that far exceeds what we now offer.n'
If they are entitled to better treatment based on the norm that those
who cannot completely choose otherwise are, to some extent, less
blameworthy than those who can, then what should we do or at least
213. Cacioppo et al., supra note 1, at 654; accord GREENFIELD, supra note 123, at 6
(stating that "there is no simple one-to-one matching between a function and a particular
part of the brain"); Mobbs et al., supra note 134, at 698.
214. Stephanie L. Sherman & Irwin D. Waldman, Identifying the Molecular Genetic
Basis of Behavioral Traits, in BEHAVIORAL GENETICS: THE CLASH OF CULTURE AND

BIOLOGY, supra note 204, at 35, 36.
215. See Jones,supra note 3, at 96; Robert Plomin, The Role ofInheritancein Behavior,
248 SCIENCE 183 (1990).
216. Neurotransmitters control the neural pathways in the brain, the "reward" centers,
the abilities to feel pleasure and pain. Studies of skin conductance among convicted
criminals show that it takes longer for an electrical charge to travel down their arms,
indicating a serotonic uptake disorder. Serotonin is the neurotransmitter that allows for
the ability to reduce pain. If it is too low, the organism can get violent. If it is too high,
the organism seeks stimulation. See, e.g., Amar Patel, Genetic Basis for Violence,
http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/bbineuro/neuroO4/web2/apatel.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2011).
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think about with respect thereto? 217 Social science has made it very
clear that we tend to over-blame individuals based on their poor
dispositions rather than their situations 2 " but that is only part of the
issue.
1. Examples from Psychopathology and Evolutionary Theory. Professor Adrian Raine is among the nation's leading researchers
on the neurobiology of crime. 21 9 His work and that of many others
demonstrates that significant PFC deficits affect an individual's
propensity to commit crimes. 220 Like the work on MAOA, Raine's work
demonstrates that genes and the environment, in combination (G x E)
and separately, create both their own and reciprocal risk factors for
antisocial outcomes. 22 1 Specifically, Raine has shown that poor functioning of the PFC predisposes an individual to violence in a number of
ways, including loss of amygdala control, enhanced tendency to risktaking, which, from the viewpoint of personality development, is
associated with impulsivity, loss of self control, and an inability to
inhibit behavior-all conditions which conduce to criminal behavior. 222
It should not be surprising that the samples of brains from a
substantial population of murderers are functionally different than those
of normal people.2 3 We have known for a century or more that
damage to certain areas of the brain conduce to violent behavior. The

217. There are, of course, substantial issues implicated in this statement-not the least
being where lines are draw between those who can't meet our social norms and those who
won't (between lack of ability and lack of will). These are not easy questions to answer,
and I offer only partial answers in this Article. Moreover, if we hue to a new model of
rehabilitation for those who we believe can't, what should we do with them? For how long
can they be incapacitated and under what conditions? If we conclude that early childhood
interventions are appropriate, how can we safeguard the privacy of those in whose lives
we intervene?
218. See Blumoff, The Problems with Blaming, supra note 65, at ch. 6.
219. An early collection of Professor Raine's work is synthesized in ADRIAN RAINE, THE
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER (1993).
220. See, e.g., Laura A. Baker et al., Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial
Behavior, 68 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (2006); Adrian Raine et al., Reduced Prefrontal
Gray Matter Volume and Reduced Autonomic Activity in Antisocial PersonalityDisorder,
57 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 119 (2000); Yaling Yang et al., Volume Reduction in
PrefrontalGray Matter in Unsuccessful CriminalPsychopaths,57 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY
1103 (2005).
221. See, e.g., Baker, supranote 220, at 41-42; Adrian Raine et al., InteractionBetween
Birth Complications and Early Maternal Rejection in PredisposingIndividuals to Adult
Violence: Specificty to Serious, Early-OnsetViolence, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1265 (1997).
222. Adrian Raine, Murderous Minds Can We See the Mark of Cain?, THE DANA
FOUNDATION (Apr. 1, 1999), www.dana.org/news/cerebrum/detail.aspx?id=3066.
223. Id.
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story of Phineas Gage has been told and retold often.22 4 Yet, anyone
who has ever visited a nursery in the neonatal section of any hospital
knows that those six, seven, and eight pound bundles of humanity were
not born evil. They may have been born with certain deficits, but they
had to grow into evilness; for that development we are all responsible.
From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, complementary
findings have emerged. The lifelong work of Martin Daly and the late
Margo Wilson underscores the relationship between evolution and crime
that is frequently present. Their work indicates the presence of "evolved
motivational mechanisms of all creatures, including ourselves, [that
were] designed to expend the organism's very life in the pursuit of
genetic posterity."22 A tendency of selection is "to facilitate behavioral
choices with the best expected fitness consequences in ancestral
environments." 226 For example, the researchers compared family
homicide rates between parent-child relationships and spousal relationships. They understood that the "parent and child are genetic relatives
with an indissoluble overlap in expected fitness ... of marriage
partners. 227 In contrast, any fitness overlap between spouses "is
predicated on reproduction and sexual fidelity."2 2 In fact, the sources
of conflict between the two relationships are very different. Their
research (in which the confounding variable of opportunity "withinhousehold" violence is held constant) shows a statistically-significant
distinction between genetic and marital homicides: "[Riates of homicide
by victim-killer relationship category were vastly higher both for spouses
and for other co-residing persons who were not genetic relatives than for
any category of blood kin;" thus, the evidence supports the thesis that
there is nepotistic discrimination in some victim-killer relationships.2 2
It seems as if selection has outfitted us with two competing tendencies:
in some individuals, there may be a strong evolutionary tendency to
commit (or at least tolerate the commission of) crime as a means of
maintaining fitness. At the same time, however, we seem to harbor even

224. See, e.g., Hanna Damasio et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the
Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient, 264 SCIENCE 1102 (1994).
225. MARTIN DALY & MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 5 (1988).
226. Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective on
Homicide, in HOMICIDE: A SOURCEBOOK OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 58,60 (M. Dwayne Smith &
Margaret A. Zahn eds., 1999).
227. Id. at 64.
228. Id.
229. Id. Daly and Wilson found that most inter-spousal homicide entailed male
proprietariness, whereas the motives for most infanticide vary depending upon age, gender,
and other variables. See Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, EvolutionarySocial Psychology and
Family Homicide, 242 SCIENCE 519 (1988).
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stronger tendencies to strike back at such tormentors. As Raine points
out, "Whether or not there is a genetic or a biological predisposition to
violence, when a violent crime is committed, we want to blame someone."mo Evolution, then, has equipped us to kill to further our genetic
aims in what appear to be conflicting ways: to kill when fitness goals are
implicated and to pursue an immediate and sometimes ruthless defense
against wrongdoing, whatever its motive." A task of neuroscience is
to bring into the forefront a third psychological quality that evolution
has provided us: compassion and forgiveness.
2. Evidence from Behavioral Genetics and Neuroscience. The
MAOA research confirms what many of us have always known: there is
a subset of violent individuals who, through no fault of their own, seem
less free than the rest of us when it comes to controlling their actions,
and they are less free because some genetic or neurochemical deficit,
combined with a physically or sexually abusive or persistently neglectful
toxic environment, produces a statistically significant greater likelihood
of violence and trouble with the law. 23 2 We have known for a long
time that a child raised in an abusive environment is more likely to
become abusive himself,' just as we have known for a long time that
"[ciriminal parents produce criminal children-yes, but [less often] if they
adopt the children."a Biologically "bad" genes are generally not, like
certain medications, formulated to take effect at some point in the

230. Raine, Murderous Minds, supranote 222.
231. See John L. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHics
3 (1982) (surveying the various forms retribution can take but suggesting that retributive
emotions promote cooperation in the long, evolutionary, run).
232. Although the data provided in this Article is mostly neuroscientific, this new data
stands on the shoulders of less technical observations. The sociology of this problem still
has deep roots in our modern history. Some recent epidemiological surveys support this
point. For a discussion on the relationship between childhood spent in an impoverished,
abusive environment and health generally, see Emalee G. Flaherty et al., Effect of Early
ChildhoodAdversity on Child Health, 160 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS ADOLESCENT MED. 1232
(2006), availableat http://archpedi.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/160/12/1232 (finding with
exposure to child abuse and neglect other serious household dysfunction at ages four to six
was associated with overall poor health outcomes, although there was no dose-response
relationship) and Crystal Wiggins et al., LiteratureReview: Developmental Problems of
Maltreated Children and Early Intervention Optionsfor Maltreated Children, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & Hum. SERVS. (Apr. 23, 2007), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/
Children-CPS/litrev/report.pdf(recording studied differences in developmental, cognitive,
and health problems, among others).
233. Widom & Brzustowicz, supra note 151, at 684.
234. RIDLEY, supra note 82, at 253.
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future; "a bad environment is also required" and vice versa.23 We can,
with help, escape or help others escape bad environments.
And for those who cannot escape? We should understand that some
individuals with organic impairments who do not attain the level of
gross and verifiable psychopathology that permits an excuse for criminal
liability really cannot stop themselves, yet they fall somewhere short of
grossly pathological on the normal-abnormal scale. We humans do not
fit into neat binary cabins that reflect differences between capacity and
volition. We expect that individuals who suffer substantial nonpsychopathological deficits and have some knowledge of their maladies
mark those deficits off, segregate them in some way, and behave forever
after in conformity with law. Unlike us, they lack complete free will and
cannot "shoulder the responsibility of keeping that organic impairment
within the confines of its boundaries.""* Individuals with damaged
brains do not operate that way.
What the literature about the PFC shows is that there is a reductive,
materialistic neurobiology to the containment, resulting in the potential
for volitional control to be impaired just as unambiguously as any other
aspect of brain function. It is possible to know the difference between
right and wrong but, for reasons of organic impairment, to not be able
to do the right thing."
Moreover, injuries suffered in infancy and early childhood may preclude
forever their ability to reason in a social and moral context.238
The essential point here is that we do not experience the world
without some changes in our neuroanatomy for good and ill. That is how
we are made. Experiences effect changes in, among other things, the
way in which neurotransmitters-the basic stuff of communication among
nerve cells-operate in conjunction with the receptors waiting to receive
them. Changes in the environment, especially but emphatically not
measured only by exposure to toxins, bear upon the way we interact
with the world. Ordinarily, the process by which these changes are
made and, subsequently, by which memories are created, are benign or
at least not harmful in the long term. Repeated instances of a harmful

235. Id. at 268.
236. Sapolsky, supra note 2, at 1793.
237. Id. at 1793-94.
238. See generally Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of
ConsequentialThought:Evidence from Neuroscience,359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL Soc'Y
LONDON B. 1797 (2004) (discussing behavioral and neuroscientific approaches to the ability
to think counterfactually about the consequences of one's actions, which is at the center of
the law's approach to criminal responsibility).
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environment, however, literally can and do alter an individual's ability
to conform to societal norms.
It is just wrong, then, to suppose that genes alone cause crime; they
do not. As noted before, there is no isomorphic correspondence between
specific, unalloyed brain structures and particular behavior, notwithstanding that a handful of genetically-linked diseases might suggest a
contrary understanding. "[Any one function depends on the contributions of many brain areas, yet any one brain area will participate in any
number of diverse functions."2 39 At the same time, it is entirely
accurate to say that individual temperament begins to be formed shortly
after conception as the fetus responds to his or her environment. Adrian
Raine summarizes the interdependence among genes, the environment,
and the tendency to criminality:
[Wihen biological and social factors are grouping variables and when
antisocial behavior is the outcome, then the presence of both risk
factors exponentially increases the rates of antisocial and violent
[When social and antisocial variables are grouping
behavior. ...
variables and biological functioning is the outcome, then the social
variable invariably moderates the antisocial-biology relationship such
that these relationships are strongest in those from benign home
backgrounds."o
Raine's summary is almost a call to arms.
IV. Getting Serious About the Brain
In light of our history of misusing scientific data to move public policy,
we have good reason to be cautious. History contains countless
instances of abuse and, too often, of irremediable injury."
The same
ability, however, to affect our development in countless unique ways
includes within it the capacity to move us in a generally more compassionate direction than we now move. We can shift the boundary away
from reinforcing a lack of empathy toward one that hopes to redirect and
rehabilitate as many injured individuals as we can. In other words, we
have within us today the ability to affect for the long term the daily
circumstances of our lives. Then what? We could do nothing, which
would still deliver something; the prevailing ethos always does. If we
can move in a more compassionate direction, we will change for the

239.

GREENFIELD, supra note 123, at 6.

240. Adrian Raine, BiosocialStudies ofAntisocialand Violent Behaviorin Childrenand
Adults: A Review, 30 J. ABNORMAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 311, 311 (2002).

241. For a survey of this history see Amanda C. Pustilnik, Violence on the Brain: A
Critique of Neuroscience in Criminal Law, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 183 (2009).
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better the location of the midpoint for the least well-off among us.
Individual development depends entirely upon how one adapts to one's
own unique environments, when the composition of the environment
includes everything that is not within our inherited genotype. If we fail,
it is because we lack the good will to move forward.

A.

What Can Work?

Judge Michael Marcus, a state trial court judge in Oregon, notes the
basic problem with our approach to sentencing and our deplorable
recidivism rates:
Legislation and ballot measures have responded to concerns about
crime with draconian sentencing provisions that limit judicial
discretion. But our litany elevates punishment well beyond its
practical utility, allowing criminal justice to compete unfairly with
social expenditures far more productive of crime prevention. We
persist in this dysfunction while lamenting, ironically, that repeat
offenders do not seem to learn from their experience."
Put simply, our ties to dualism and the nearly irrebuttable presumption
that "they could have chosen otherwise," combined with the mire of
retributivism and the easy political chant of "get tough on crime,"
continue to undermine our own self-interest. Lawrence Sherman and
others list a number of alternatives that have produced promising
results: vocational training for older male ex-offenders; nuisance
abatement action on landlords for rental housing with drug dealing;
extra police patrols for high-crime hot spots; monitoring by specialized
police units for high-risk repeat offenders; incarceration; on-scene arrests
for domestic abusers who are employed; rehabilitation programs with
risk-focused treatments for convicted offenders; and therapeutic
community treatment programs for drug-using offenders in prison.'
Although there are numerous reasons given for the continuation of the
long unsuccessful "get tough on crime" regime (including, in many
instances, the same lack of success concerning the socio-pathology of
drug related crime), among the most frightening conclusions we can
reach is that with respect to rehabilitation nothing works," which
was the litany of unreliable science that often defined the 1980s. Only
242. Michael H. Marcus, Sentencing in the Temple of Denunciation:CriminalJustice's
Weakest Link, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 671, 673 (2004).
243. NATL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Preventing Crime: What Works,
What Doesn't, What's Promising (July 1998), available at http/www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/
171676.pdf.
244. See DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT.
A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975).
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slightly less general is the lamentable reality "that we routinely make
sentencing choices without information that would help us choose that
disposition most likely to avoid future victimizations." 24 5 That nothing
Some approaches do work, but
works was a vast overstatement."
they require careful attention to control over a number of details,
including careful attention to the risks that conduce to criminal
behavior, the empirical support for those programs that do work, and the
careful identification of those for whom such programs are most
successful." Then, of course, competency and consistency in delivering the programs have to be assured as does a commitment to determining how to sustain the ethic over time.
Beyond all that, nothing will get accomplished in changing the current
state of affairs without good will, a goal that is now unimaginably far
from our current state of affairs. (This lack of good will is also
unimaginably further from reality than at any prior time in my life.)
Legislators and penal administrators have it in their means to fund the
kind of responses to criminality that could make us all safer as we go to
sleep at night. Instead, the emphasis on "get tough" measures has
Retribution, which is to some
created its own vicious dynamic."
extent inescapable in any system of punishment that necessarily begins
by looking backwards, is not alone (or perhaps ever) the answer for
moving forward. With information arriving from neuroscience and
elsewhere, we should begin to bring more thoughtful and successful
rehabilitative measures to the forefront of corrections. Bringing this
information to the front lines of corrections requires substantial
rethinking for our punishment theory and, if we do so, we advance
Lincoln's understanding of the better angels of our nature.
Escaping the current retributive regime will not be easy. In his essay
Morality and the Retributive Emotions, J.L. Mackie describes our

245. Marcus, supra note 242, at 676. This point was brought home repeatedly in
presentations by, and conversations with, both federal and state court judges, at the trial
and appellate levels, at the Annual Conference of the Gruter Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research, Squaw Valley, California, May 18-21, 2009.
246. See, e.g., Mark W. Lipsey & Francis T. Cullen, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Rehabilitation:A Review of Systematic Reviews, 3 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. Scl. 297 (2007),
availableat http//www.nicic.gov/Library/022757 (undertaking a review of completed metaanalyses of studies of rehabilitation and recidivism and concluding that some rehabilitative
approaches do in fact work, but the issue is complex).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. For a well-chronicled narrative of this sad story, see Eric Schlosser, The PrisonIndustrial Complex, THE ATLANTIc (Dec. 1998), http://www.theatlantic.com/pastlissues/
98dec/prisons.htm.
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unwillingness to challenge the established moral arrangements as an
instantiation of "the supposed objective prescriptivity of moral features."2o Mackie would not assert that we can find an objective
account of moral qualities or facts; he repudiates this kind of foundationalism. Instead, he observes correctly that our moral intuitions "are
developed by social interactions and then, through objectivization, yield
the misleading appearance of objective reality."ss In the domain of
moral philosophy on which our criminal law rests, one of those truths is
that citizens in a liberal democracy begin their journey to a vision of
civic virtue from different places. As individuals, we venture into moral
philosophy only after we are "already immersed in the assumptions and
precedents of a tradition . . . .

[They are] not so much arbitrary as

inescapable: .. . shaped by the grammar of our native tongue." 2 One
should add, in the nature of our beings.
I would like to make use of our language and our deeply-held beliefs
about human possibility to suggest a more compassionate approach to
punishment, one that retains responsibility as the core concept but
advances the goal without necessarily (or fully) blaming the offender, at
least for offenders who substantially lack capacity-in-fact or opportunity.
The question is not whether those who are adjudicated guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for misconduct we deem criminal and who present a
risk of harm to the first or second order interests of others should be
So
segregated and constrained for an appropriate amount of time.'
given
the
First,
how,
follows:
are
as
two
questions
much is obvious. The
visible effects of our neurobiology and, consequently, the vast expanse of
our lives over which we have little if any control, are we best served in
accounting for the crucial fraction of self over which some citizens lack
either capacity-in-fact or the experiences conducive to sufficient control,
understanding that control or lack of control is a difficult determination?
Second, can we accomplish some movement toward a more compassion-

250. Mackie, supra note 231, at 7.
251. Id.
252. JEFFREY STOUT, ETHIcS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR
DISCONTENTS 120 (1988).
253. See Michael D. Bayles, Punishment for Attempts, 8 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 19, 23
(1982) (distinguishing between the nature of the interest the putative criminal invades,
first or second-order, in which completed crimes violate a first-order interest; that is, the
harm violates the interest in life, liberty, or property, and attempted crimes, in contrast,
violate second-order interests, the freedom from fear of loss of a first-order interest, or
security).
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ate polity consistent with our normatively honorable and shared
commitment to love and protect our neighbors?"
Therefore, in addition to changing our approach to corrections, we
should give serious consideration to some thoughtful suggestions about
(1) changing some of our burdens of proof, (2) adding some robustness
to our understanding of rationality and diminished capacity, and (3)
bringing the new neuroscientific data to our definition of insanity. The
point here is that data from the new brain sciences can help determine
whether individuals possess "particular capacities" that our current
jurisprudence requires.25 For example, Terry Maroney, with others,
has made a strong case for recognizing the full role emotions play in our
understanding of competence, yet that role is routinely marginalized in
our law.256
As the Supreme Court recently made clear, most states still use some
version of the M'Naghten2 " rule for insanity, which emphasizes lack
of cognition alone as a condition for establishing insanity.258 How can
anyone possibly prioritize cognitions without emotional input? It is true
that differentiating between "can't" control and "won't" control presents
a particularly difficult distinction to make, but it is not impossible. We
ask our mental health professionals to make even more difficult
decisions daily, such as predicting future dangerousness for purposes of
involuntary civil commitment or post-conviction and sentencing
commitment. 2 59 As Damasio and others point out, individuals who

254. I addressed this issue several times in a narrower context. See, e.g., Blumoff, An
Essay on Liberalism, supra note 6.
255. Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289,
300 (1998).
256. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding,"and the
Criminal Defendant, 43 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 1375 (2006) (arguing that an accurate
assessment of adjudicative competence requires attention to the emotional influences on
decision-making); see also The Supreme Court's Pursuit of Procedural Maxima over
Substantive Minima in Mental Capacity Determinations,121 HARV. L. REV. 1156 (2008).
257. M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
258. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750-51 & nn.12-21 (2006). The lack of cognition
in the original M'Naghten rule had two dimensions: one addressing knowledge of the
nature and quality of one's act and the other emphasizing knowledge that what the
defendant was doing was wrong. One is excused from crime if "the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or as not to know that what he was doing was
wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 720.
259. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 n.2 (1997) (holding that state
sexual predator statutes that rely on such predictions do not violate due process, despite
the understanding "that it was not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy the
future dangerousness of a sex offender"); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-903 (1983)
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suffer sub-psychopathological deficits to discrete neurological areas of the
brain may be fully able to tackle problems of logic, and yet "many of
their personal and social decisions are irrational, more often disadvantageous to their selves and to others than not."" Some doctrine that
gives scope to these obviously important observations is in order."
B.

Why FindingSomething that Can Work Matters
The law moves from day to day by following a fairly strict calendar,
which is an absolutely necessary process. That necessity, however,
leaves precious little time for practitioners to step back and ask big
questions. As a result, basic principles are adhered to and are left
mostly unquestioned. From time to time, we should return to basic
principles, to the foundations of our commitment to a shared public
theology. We can and must reorient the perspective for judgment by
taking seriously our commitment to compassion. It is fundamental to
Judeo-Christian ethics-"love your neighbor as yourself."26 2
We profess to honor compassion. I suggest that we actually practice
compassion to fill the void left when blame and shame are inappropriate
responses to wrongdoing, and they are inappropriate when that which
should exist as natural parts of any psychologically healthy person-the
capacity for empathy and the ability to control one's conduct-are
absent.26 3 The model we ought to subscribe to follows the instructions
of Hillel, which proclaims our a posteriori maxim of universal compas-

(holding that psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness are admissible despite
protests from the American Psychiatric Association).
260. ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS: BODY AND EMOTION IN THE
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 41 (1999).

261. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003). I have suggested that for a certain class of excuses the
government should bear the risk of non-persuasion whenever the certain provoking
conditions raise a question about the defendant's ability to exercise all the various facets
of freedom of action. See Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Neuropsychology of Justificationsand
Excuses: Some Cases from Self-Defense, Duress, and Provocation, 50 JURIMETRICS 391
(2010). An earlier version of the forthcoming work is available at http//ssrn.com/
abstract=1380081 (posted Apr. 15, 2009).
262. Matthew 22:39 (New Living Translation).
263. See William J. Prior, Compassion:A Critique of Moral Rationalism, 2 PHIL. &
THEoLOGY 173, 178 (1987); see also James E. Gilman, Compassion and Public Covenant:
ChristianFaithin Public Life, 36 J. CHURCH & ST. 747, 766 (1994) (noting that compassion
implicates public policy in two ways-one preventative and one curative-and both should
prevent the adoption of policies that cause "involuntary, social suffering" and alleviate
suffering where it already exits).
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sion negatively: "What is hateful unto you, don't do unto your neighbor
The rest is commentary-now go and study.'"
The suggestions put forth in the previous section provide a starting
point for a new system to operate. The regime I envision initially
suspends blame and begins at a biographically earlier point in time.
The regime hopes to determine who the person is who deserves our
harshest treatment, not merely whether he committed the crime. We
should view the propriety of punishment or treatment in a given case as
dependent upon scoring on two axes: one axis measures capacity-in-fact,
the other axis measures opportunity and its use. On the first axis, the
questions address cognition and control: either the wrongdoer has or
does not have sufficient cognitive skills to know right from wrong, and
he either can or cannot control his behavior. If he lacks either, he lacks
Although neuropsychological testing and brain
capacity-in-fact."'
imaging may not be perfect, they can provide useful insights into an
individual's brain functioning. 266 The other axis addresses socioeconomic and educational opportunity: one does or does not have such
opportunities, and if he has had sufficient opportunity, he either did or
did not make appropriate use of them in the past. Under this proposal,
meeting the demands of minimum instrumental reasoning-effecting a
simple syllogism-simply indicates that the actor should remain in the
standard criminal justice system. For those unable even to effectuate a
simple practical syllogism, cognitive competency remains an issue; that
is to say, blameworthiness is surely compromised and psychiatric
treatment and incapacitation may still be required.
Thus, those who have ample cognitive capacity, emotional control, and
good fortune but fail to make use of it are, prima facie, the most culpable
both morally and intuitively; when compared to those who are cognitively, emotionally, or experientially deprived, they more likely could have
done otherwise (their crimes may also be the most deterrable).2 6 7 In

264. JOSEPH TELUSHKIN, JEWISH LITERACY: THE MOST IMPORTANT THINGS TO KNOW
ABOUT THE JEWISH RELIGION, ITS PEOPLE, AND ITS HISTORY 47 (1991). The legend behind
the story is told in many sources. See, e.g., KAREN ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD: THE
4,000-YEAR QUEST OF JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 72 (1993).

265. It is worth noting again that the metrics to make such determinations are not easy
to achieve. Neuropsychological testing is in its infancy. Nevertheless, if we approach the
questions with a view toward rehabilitation rather than retributive punishment, we may
gain new insights into how we make these decisions.
266. See, e.g., Joseph H. Baskin et al., Is a Picture Worth a Thousand Words?
Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239 (2007).
267. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noting
that a brief period of incarceration for wealthy, well-educated older men who plead guilty
to multiple state and federal counts of criminal deliberate non-impulsive fraud "are among
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contrast, those who lack both capacities and suffer bad luck are the least
blameworthy for, prima facie, they could not have done otherwise. In
the middle are those who possess sufficient cognitive skill and capacityin-fact but lack the opportunity to adapt appropriately or lack the
capacities but have been blessed with good opportunities. They may well
require restraint but probably not blame, and certainly they do not
require vengeful, retributive treatment. For all such groups, education
and treatment during their period of incapacity are the only meaningful
moral alternatives if protecting future generations is our goal.
C.

Moving Ahead: Taking the Brain Seriously
This work began by setting out a view of our criminal jurisprudence
that has been substantially unchanged since Descartes set us on the
path to an unforgiving dualist view of humankind. That view, coupled
with the rediscovery of Aristotle, led us to the neurobiologically naive
Humean view that we are all responsible for our own characters such
that when one does an evil deed, one is almost always deemed to have
ample capacity to choose that act. Findings from the brain sciences have
put that dictum to the test. Some among us suffer major deficits that
do not rise to the law's test of gross and verifiable psychopathology.
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as

universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom
of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal
individual to choose between good and evil."

In the same paragraph of the Supreme Court's decision in Morissette v.
United States, 6 9 Justice Jackson lamented the "tardy and unfinished
substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and
vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution."2 70 The ability to
choose between good and evil is the moral base of our criminal law: "I

have put before you life and death, blessing and curse. Choose life
271 Hebrew scripture tells us that "even though we have the
ability to do evil, we should not do evil. We should do good." 272
. .

those most likely to be generally deterrable").
268. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
269. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
270. Id. at 251.
271. Deuteronomy 30:19 (Tanakh).
272. On the Nature of Free Will, BEING JEWISH, http://www.beingjewish.com/soulfree
will.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
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For nearly two hundred years, we have known that some individuals
who are adjudicated competent and sane nonetheless lack the wherewithal to choose good. Observers have noted the relationship between
injury to the prefrontal lobes, mostly the orbitofrontal cortex and "poor
impulse control, explosive aggressive outbursts, inappropriate verbal
lewdness, jocularity, and lack of interpersonal sensitivity."211 Scientific
evidence of dysfunction in the amygdala has been associated with violent
aggressive behavior for nearly a generation.274 Furthermore, we have
known that many children who have been subjected to abuse or neglect
early in their lives bear emotional scars that sometimes do not go away,
and they often suffer brain dysfunctions that conduce to a life of violence
and criminality. 275 The only remaining question is this: when will our
criminal justice system take seriously what we have known to be the
case almost forever? There are individuals who could not do otherwise,
and punishing them-as opposed to incapacitating and treating
them-fails our basic standard of morality.

273. M.C. Brower & B.H. Price, NeuropsychiatryofFrontalLobe Dysfunction in Violent
and Criminal Behaviour: A Critical Review, 71 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY &
PSYCHIATRY 720, 720 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. See, e.g., LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN, supra note 137, at chs. 6-7; LAURENCE
TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY 34-36
(2005) (noting that the amygdala circuit stores emotional memories and makes quick
assessments of the environment through connections to sensory cortex and the PFC);
R.J.R. Blair, The Roles of the Orbital Frontal Cortex in the Modulation of Antisocial
Behavior, 55 BRAIN & COGNITION 198 (2004) (finding a strong connection between
amygdala dysfunction and psychopathic behavior); Mobbs et al., supra note 134, at 699.
275. Ferguson, supranote 155 (analyzing thirty-eight published articles based on more
than fifty observations between 1996 and 2006 in behavioral genetics that genetics
contributes substantially to the development of antisocial personality and behavior);
Teicher, supra note 162 (suggesting that abuse disrupts functioning of the limbic system,
"a collection of interconnected brain nuclei (neural centers) that play a pivotal role in the
regulation of emotion and memory," and especially the hippocampus, which is important
in retrieving memories, and amygdala, which plays a prominent role in creating the
emotional subject matter of memory, such as fear and aggressive responses thereto);
Widom & Brzustowicz, supra note 151.

